Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud by Klock, Mark
Volume 116 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 116, 
2011-2012 
10-1-2011 
Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: 
Time to Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders 
and Abettors of Securities Fraud 
Mark Klock 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to Expressly Provide 
for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 DICK. L. REV. 437 (2011). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol116/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
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Provide for Private Enforcement Against
Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud
Mark Klock*
Abstract
Financial markets do not function well when fraud is pervasive. It
has been well documented that financial fraud has increased following
changes in securities law that occurred in the 1990's. Also around
September of 2009, the investigations into the SEC examinations of
Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, LLC were completed and
released to the public. The simple facts reveal an alarming level of
incompetence and lack offinancial literacy on the part of the guardians
of the integrity of our financial markets. I suggest two important tools
for addressing these problems. One is to supplement enforcement of
anti-fraud rules with more private attorney generals by expressly
creating a private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of
securities laws. This will foster a stronger culture of integrity and
ethical conduct in the auditing profession. An additional tool is to
increase financial literacy in our law schools which supply the
regulators of our markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From the shocking surprise decision in the 1994 case of Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,I through the
somewhat predictable outcome but poorly reasoned 2008 decision in
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,2 the
latter-day Supreme Court has systematically reduced the ability of
defrauded investors to recover their losses from culpable participants
who did not sell securities or communicate with investors.3 With the
recent revelations that the Securities and Exchange Commission's Office
1. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
2. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
3. See id at 178-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Until Central Bank, the federal
courts continued to enforce a broad implied cause of action for the violation of statutes
enacted in 1933 and 1934 for the protection of investors. . . . Today's decision simply
cuts back further on Congress' intended remedy.").
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of Compliance, Investigations, and Examinations has not performed its
responsibilities to the public with any diligence, as exemplified by
Bernard Madoff and other scandals,4 the time is ripe for Congressional
action to provide more express remedies in private actions based on
securities fraud.5 In this article, I will review the history of aiding and
abetting liability for secondary participants under the federal securities
laws,6 and review the public record of the SEC's incompetence in
detecting Ponzi schemes7 and unwillingness to pursue aiders of securities
fraud violations.8  I argue that these factors working together have
fostered a culture of less than ethical conduct on the part of accountants,
auditors, corporations, and financial intermediaries which contributed to
the recent financial crisis.9 Legislative changes to expressly promote
4. See generally Mark Klock, Lessons Learned from Bernard Madoff Why We
Should Partially Privatize the Barney Fifes at the SEC, 42 ARIz. ST. L.J. 783, 784-835
(2010) (documenting the mishandling of Madoff by SEC staff and noting that the case
was not an isolated incident); Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory
Failure and the Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 363-81 (2009)
(documenting SEC malfeasance in the Madoff fraud).
5. See Where Were the Watchdogs? Financial Crises and Breakdown of Financial
Governance, Statement before Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
111th Cong. 355 (Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, Perm.
Subcomm. on Investigations) ("Legislation reversing Stoneridge would restore civil
liability for aiders and abettors of corporate fraud.").
6. See generally William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under The Federal
Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency:
Common-Law Principles and The Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 313-76 (1989)
(providing a comprehensive history of aiding and abetting and other forms of secondary
liability under federal securities laws); Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud
Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 611, 619-83 (2008) (discussing
historical development of liability for participation in securities fraud).
7. See generally, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT No. 509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME (Aug. 31, 2009) [hereinafter OIG,
INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf (last
visited Jan. 11, 2011) (documenting the public evidence of malfeasance by the SEC staff
regarding Madoff s massive fraud).
8. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance,
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 522 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 06-
43), 2007 WL 2329639 (arguing for the defendants and against the plaintiffs seeking
recovery from participants in securities fraud); Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and
Officials and Law and Finance Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance,
Stoneridge, 522 U.S. 148 (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329638 (listing sixteen former SEC
officials (three chairs, eleven commissioners, and two general counsel) arguing for the
defendants and against the plaintiffs seeking recovery from participants in securities
fraud).
9. Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic
History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 287-92 (2004) (suggesting that the
increase in financial scandals based on financial reporting irregularities can be attributed
to a shift in the cost-benefit analysis of incentives due to a decreased litigation threat and
an increase in profitability of aggressive earnings reporting).
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more aggressive private enforcement of our securities laws would
necessarily change the culture and promote more ethical behavior in our
financial markets.' 0
Historically, securities regulation in the United States adopted a
non-paternalistic philosophy of requiring full and fair disclosure enforced
in large part with broad civil liability for those who perpetrated fraud in
the public market for securities." Certain devices were created to
provide powerful incentives to issuers.12  For example, strict liability
provisions relieve plaintiffs from the burden of proving loss causation. 3
Given this strong anti-fraud environment, public markets flourished and
contributed to low capital costs, capital investment, economic prosperity,
and victory in the Cold War.14 In this environment, the application of
aiding and abetting doctrine to the securities laws seemed to be a natural
development.' 5  In that regime, accountants, auditors, and bankers
rationally feared liability for assisting securities fraud and therefore had
powerful incentives to act with high ethical standards.16  In the new
environment in which the aiding and abetting doctrine has been rendered
toothless, unethical conduct by key players in the financial markets has
been the predictable result.'7
10. See Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron Experience: Will It Be
Regulation of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability?, 28 J. CORP. L. 69, 104-
06 (2002) (arguing that legislation to expressly private liability for aiding and abetting
securities fraud is needed to improve ethical standards in financial reporting).
11. See, e.g., MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (4th ed. 2004) (noting
that the philosophy of the federal government in securities regulation has been designed
to provide investors with accurate and complete information).
12. For example, the strict liability for those who offer or sell a security using a false
or misleading communication. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006).
13. LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION 253
(5th ed. 2003) ("Proof of causation is not a requirement for recovery. . . .").
14. See Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme
to Defraud Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and
Reasoning ofStoneridge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 353 (2010) (describing the importance
of well-functioning financial markets, but noting flourishing markets require an anti-
fraud environment).
15. See generally Prentice, supra note 6, at 619-63 (analyzing the common law of
fraud and its incorporation into the Securities Exchange Act).
16. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 287-90 (describing the regime shift from one where
auditors faced frequent class-action litigation and exposure to large judgments to one in
which they were insulated from large legal exposure).
17. Cf Prentice, supra note 6, at 682 (pointing out that a majority of the Supreme
Court is no longer opposed to fraud); Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruption and
the Complicity of Congress and the Supreme Court-The Tortuous Path from Central
Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 197 (2009) ("What
is clear is the complicity of the Supreme Court because it was well aware of the
fraudulent activity and nonetheless insulated defendants from liability. It is strong
language to suggest that the Supreme Court is complicit in furthering fraud.").
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF AIDING AND ABETTING DOCTRINE IN
SECURITIES FRAUD
A. Legal Authority for Aiding and Abetting Liability in Federal
Securities Law
The principle that one could be held liable for aiding and abetting a
violation of federal securities law evolved as a straightforward
application of a doctrine used in criminal, agency, and tort law.18 Under
these bodies of law, an individual can be held jointly liable as a primary
violator of a duty if he assists or supports the violation of a duty actually
committed by the primary violator, or is liable for the violation through a
relationship (such as an employment contract or parental control) with
the violator.19 So, for example, if one assists in preparing false financial
statements by engaging in bogus business transactions and falsifying
documents to provide an appearance of legitimacy to the transactions,
that individual could have been held liable twenty years ago for
securities fraud even if he was not present and did not participate in the
sale of the securities. 20 Today such behavior cannot be subject to private
actions,21 so the incentives to act ethically are greatly reduced and the
result of the changed incentives is an obvious increase in unethical
behavior. 22
Aiding and abetting liability for fraud was part of the common-law
environment prior to enactment of the securities laws, which sought to
expand investor protection.23  Given the broad remedial intent of the
18. See Kuehnle, supra note 6, at 314 n.1 (stating that secondary civil liability under
the federal securities laws is derived from agency and tort law and to a lesser extent
criminal law).
19. See William C. Humphreys, Jr., Aiding and Abetting Liability of Accountants in
Securities Fraud Cases, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 375, 379-80 (1990) (describing the elements of
aiding and abetting liability).
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Wash. Cnty. Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 223 (6th Cir. 1982)
("Direct contacts require neither physical presence nor face to face conversation. A
person undertaking to furnish information which is misleading because of a failure to
disclose a material fact is a primary participant."); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1315
n.24 (6th Cir. 1974) ("An accountant or lawyer, for instance, who prepares a dishonest
statement is a primary participant in a violation even though someone else may conduct
the personal negotiations with a securities purchaser.").
21. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 160-
61 (2008) (holding that fraud in the transactions underlying the public statements about
the securities is not actionable under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act).
22. See Klock, supra note 14, at 344 ("A rule that allows everything except that
which is not expressly prohibited encourages excessive unethical behavior and will drive
capital out of the market.").
23. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 179-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Courts near in time
to the enactment of the securities laws recognized that the principle in Rigsby applied to
the securities laws." (citing Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) for the
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securities laws to proscribe bad behavior in financial markets and
promote confidence and integrity in the markets, it was quite logical to
continue application of the doctrine after enactment of the '33 Securities
Act and the '34 Securities Exchange Act. 24  Essentially, the doctrine
required the existence of a securities law violation, at least one primarily
liable party, and at least one party that provided substantial assistance to
a primary violator. 2 5 The level of knowledge about the violation required
varied across circuits, and in some cases interacted with the level of
assistance provided. 26 So a low level of assistance might require actual
knowledge and a high level of assistance might merely require a reckless
disregard.27 In some circuits, the knowledge requirement was less strict
when the aider and abettor received a financial benefit from his
participation.2 8
Although secondary liability was not expressly provided for in the
original federal securities laws, except for a few limited provisions,
secondary liability for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act was recognized in all eleven circuits of the
Courts of Appeals to have considered the question before 1994.29 In
1988, one commentator wrote: "[S]econdary liability ... has become so
well established in the securities law that courts rarely question its
basis."3 0  In addition to the universal support given by every federal
circuit to some form of secondary liability under implied private rights of
proposition that members of a class for whom a statutory duty is created have the right to
recover damages from those who disregard the statute)); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 192-93 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The early aiding and abetting cases relied upon principles borrowed from
tort law; . . . judges closer to the times and climate of the 73d Congress than we
concluded that holding aiders and abettors liable was consonant with the Exchange Act's
purpose to strengthen the antifraud remedies of the common law.").
24. See generally, Prentice, supra note 6, at 622-30 (describing the common law of
fraud as it existed in 1934 when Congress sought to expand investor protection from
fraud).
25. See, e.g., Humphreys, supra note 19, at 379-80 (describing the elements required
for liability typical in the case law).
26. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975) (adopting a
sliding scale for scienter based on the proximity of the activity).
27. See Kuehnle, supra note 6, at 330 ("Some courts also have adopted an approach
of linking the level of knowledge required to the degree of assistance rendered.").
28. See Walck v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 791 n.18 (3d Cir. 1982);
Gould v. Am.-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir. 1976) ("The requirement of
knowledge may be less strict where the alleged aider and abettor derives benefits from
the wrongdoing.").
29. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 192 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("All 11 Courts of Appeals to have
considered the question have recognized a private cause of action against aiders and
abettors under 10(b) and Rule lob-5.").
30. Kuehnle, supra note 6, at 315.
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action in the federal securities laws, both strong policy arguments and the
philosophical approach of the U.S. Supreme Court towards securities law
suggested that secondary liability was an embedded component of the
implied private right of action under Section 10(b).3 1
Secondary liability for commercial fraud was firmly established law
prior to passage of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, in
1933 and 1934, respectively.32 Presumably, Congress intended to
provide investors with at least as much protection after the Acts as they
had before the Acts' enactment, and elimination of secondary liability
would be contrary to that presumption. 3 Furthermore, the Court has
recognized the broad remedial intent of Congress under the securities
laws and embraced a cumulative approach under which investor
protections would cumulate and not be interpreted as exclusive.
Although Supreme Court decisions expressly reserved the question of the
existence of aiding and abetting liability for a future case,35 lower courts
continued to apply the doctrine in all circuits, and the Supreme Court has
decided some cases that were close analogies to aiding and abetting
securities law violations that arguably supported application of the
doctrine.3 For example, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,37 the
Court-without explanation-found a bank secondarily liable for insider
trading by its employees. 3 8 In a subsequent case not involving securities
laws, the Court recognized secondary liability under federal statutory
liability holding an employer liable for violations of antitrust law by its
employees. 3 9  In a decision closer to point, the Court interpreted the
31. Cf Murdock, supra note 17, at 166-67 (discussing inconsistency between the
Central Bank decision and Supreme Court precedent); Marc I. Steinberg, The
Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and State Securities
Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 489-90 (1995) ("[T]he [Central Bank] Court
misconstrues its own precedent.").
32. See Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have a Future after
Stoneridge?, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 351, 373-74 (2009) (discussing liability and the many
recoveries for participating in fraud under pre-1934 common law).
33. See id. at 358-59 ("Congress believed that it had to enact the Securities Act ...
and the Securities Exchange Act . . . because state securities laws and the common law of
fraud had been inadequate to the task of protecting investors. . . . The purpose of section
10(b) was to expand, not contract, the protections ..... ").
34. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-87 (1983).
35. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 192 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have reserved decision on the
legitimacy of the theory in two cases that did not present it. . . ." (referring to Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7 (1976) and Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 379 n.5)).
36. See Kuehnle, supra note 6, at 316-18 (discussing Supreme Court cases in the
1970's and 1980's that could have supported secondary liability under the federal
securities laws).
37. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
38. Id. at 154.
39. Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 567 (1982).
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Commodity Exchange Act to allow liability under a secondary
conspiracy theory, explaining that participants in a conspiracy to
manipulate commodity prices are also subject to suit.4 0
Additional cases provide further ammunition for broadly construing
investor protections under securities law. For example, in Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston,41 the Court embraced the cumulative remedy
approach holding that a plaintiff may maintain an implied cause of action
under Section 10(b) for action expressly prohibited under Section 11 of
the Securities Exchange Act.42  The Court noted the savings clauses
included in the '33 and '34 Acts whereby "Congress rejected the notion
that the express remedies of the securities laws would preempt all other
rights of action."43 The Court also noted the language of the Acts
providing that the remedies are "in addition to any and all other rights
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."44 The Huddleston
Court further observed that "[a] cumulative construction of the securities
laws also furthers their broad remedial purposes."45
Over time, many commentators have favored the broad remedial
construction of the securities laws as an anti-fraud and pro-investor
device.46 For example, in 1982, Professor Marc Steinberg wrote:
The policy rationale for overlapping remedies is to ensure that the
failure of an injured investor to meet the technical requirements for
recovering under an express cause of action does not undermine
investor protection and the integrity of the marketplace. Proponents
of exclusivity, however, assert that the statutory language and
legislative history of the express causes of action indicate that to
recognize an implied remedy in this context would frustrate the
statutory scheme intended by Congress. They conclude that where
the plaintiff cannot proceed under an express provision, Congress
intended that he not proceed at all.47
More recently, in 2008 Professor Robert Prentice observed:
When Congress legislated in 1934, the common law of fraud and
virtually every existing body offraudjurisprudence imposed liability
40. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394
(1982).
41. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
42. Id. at 386-87.
43. Id at 383.
44. Id
45. Id. at 386.
46. See, e.g., ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIs D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAuD &
COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 2:69 (2010) (describing authority for broad cumulative
interpretation of § 10(b)).
47. Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 557, 559 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
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upon those who knowingly participated in a fraud It is nearly
inconceivable that a Congress legislating in 1934 (or an SEC making
rules in 1942) would have intended anything else for the broadly
drawn Section 10(b)/Rule l0b-5.... [I]t would have been
superfluous to have included an express provision imposing a form of
aiding and abetting secondary liability when, given the existing state
of the law, Congress would necessarily have envisioned that knowing
participation in securities fraud would result in joint and several
liability. 48
In between these commentators the SEC argued in a brief that there are
two important reasons for maintaining expansive liability in private
litigation: to deter fraud and to make investors whole. 49 This overall
philosophy favors a private right of action for aiding and abetting
violations of securities laws.
Although the Court expressly reserved a decision about the viability
of secondary liability under the securities laws in decisions made in the
1970's and 1980's, it came tantalizingly close to giving approval in
dicta.o In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, the Court wrote in a
footnote:
The trial court also found that Herman & MacLean had aided and
abetted violations of § 10(b). While several Courts of Appeals have
permitted aider-and-abettor liability, see IIT, An International
Investment Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (CA2 1980)
(collecting cases), we specifically reserved this issue in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, [425 U.S. 185,] 191-192, n. 7 [(1976)]. Cf. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394
(1982) (discussing liability for participants in a conspiracy under
analogous Commodity Exchange Act provision).51
The passage cited by the Court in this cf cite reads, "[I]t necessarily
follows that those persons who are participants in a conspiracy to
manipulate the market in violation of those rules are also subject to suit
by futures traders who can prove injury from these violations." 52 Given
the similarity in the language and intent of the Commodity Exchange Act
48. Prentice, supra note 6, at 622-23 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
49. Brief for the SEC in Support of Respondents, Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854), 1993 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 444 at *32 (arguing that private actions against culpable parties assist
the SEC in deterring fraud and serves as the primary method of compensating victims).
50. See Humphreys, supra note 19, at 378 ("If this [Hochfelder] cite [to Huddleston]
was intended to forecast a future ruling on the existence of the cause of action, aiding and
abetting liability will likely be recognized.").
51. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983).
52. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394
(1982).
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compared with the Securities Exchange Act, it would be reasonable to
conclude that liability would also accrue to participants for a violation of
the Securities Exchange Act rules given the language used and cited by
the Court.53
Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for a leading securities law
casebook in 1986 to state, "Virtually every lower court decision that has
addressed the issue, however, has recognized the propriety of imposing
such liability in appropriate circumstances." 54 Furthermore, this scholar
argued:
When Congress substantially revised the securities laws in 1975, a
plethora of lower courts (including every appellate court that
considered the question) had recognized the propriety of aider and
abettor liability. Accordingly, relying upon the thrust of Curran and
Huddleston, "[i]n light of this well-established judicial interpretation,
Congress' decision to leave [aider and abettor liability] intact
suggests that Congress ratified the [propriety of this type of
liability]."
B. Policy Arguments for Aiding andAbetting Liability
Of course policy arguments also strongly favor liability for aiding
and abetting.56  There were, and still are, strong policy arguments
supporting the doctrine of private action liability for aiding and abetting
violations of securities laws.57 Aside from the obvious benefit of
providing redress for defrauded investors against culpable parties, the
doctrine fosters a culture of ethical behavior in the financial markets-
something that is sorely needed today.58 If accountants, auditors, and
bankers know that assisting in a fraud can subject them to private
53. See Kuehnle, supra note 6, at 317 ("Thus, it appears [based on Curran] that the
Court is not adverse to the use of secondary liability in federal law in general or in the
securities laws in particular.").
54. MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 515 (1986).
55. Id. at 516 (citing Curran, 456 U.S. at 387; Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 385-86)
(alterations in original).
56. See Brief for the SEC in Support of Respondents, Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854), 1993 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 444 at *32 (arguing that private actions against culpable parties assist
the SEC in deterring fraud and serves as the primary method of compensating victims).
57. See id.
58. As the author has previously explained:
[P]recise rules can have the effect of encouraging everyone to operate in the
ethical gray zone. The expressed minimum standard of conduct becomes
acceptable. What is not expressly prohibited becomes ethical. Conversely, a
rule imposing liability for less than full and fair disclosure should lead to
disclosure in questionable matters.
Klock, supra note 10, at 106.
446 [Vol. 116:2
IMPROVING THE CULTURE OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
litigation and liability they will have powerful incentives not to provide
such assistance and will be less likely to do so." On the other hand, if
accountants, auditors, and bankers know that they can provide assistance
in a fraud as long as they stay in the safe harbor of avoiding direct
transactions and communications with investors, then they clearly have
no economic incentive operating as a deterrent. 60  There are virtually
zero meritorious policy arguments against liability for aiding and
abetting fraud.6 1  The only argument that can be made against this
liability is quite simply the narrow legal argument that since Congress
did not expressly write it into the law, Congress did not intend it. 6 2
When the Supreme Court ultimately addressed the question of
secondary liability under the securities laws, this was their only argument
against secondary liability-that the original laws were largely silent as
to the availability of redress against secondary actors and, therefore,
where Congress did not expressly provide for it, it should not be
available. 63  However, that argument can easily be turned around to
suggest that where Congress did not expressly exclude redress, it should
be available.64 Even more persuasive, however, is the context of the law
as it existed in 1934. Professor Prentice conducts a careful and
59. See, e.g., Klock, supra note 4, at 835 ("Only with the threat of private
enforcement actions will the players in the markets have sufficiently strong incentives to
play honestly and conduct their business with integrity.").
60. One practicing securities lawyer recently commented on the current state of the
law:
[A] professional can rest easy so long as the attorney, CPA, and investment
banker make no statements to the public. It appears no matter their culpability,
they will escape private civil liability under § 10(b) and the Rule. The lawyer
that works, plans and schemes with his client to deceive and defraud the
investing public, but who is careful to make no public statements, is free of
civil liability....
Stuart Sinai, Stoneridge-Escape from Securities Liability Notwithstanding Active,
Intentional, Deceptive Conduct, 8 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 170, 187 (2008).
61. In theory, one could make a policy argument that litigation is costly, therefore
we should proscribe large categories of potential litigation against culpable wrongdoers,
but this argument is so specious I will not give it attention beyond this note.
62. Indeed, this is the only argument regarding aiding and abetting given by the
majority in the Stoneridge decision. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008) ("Congress amended the securities laws to
provide for limited coverage of aiders and abettors. Aiding and abetting liability is
authorized in actions brought by the SEC but not by private parties.").
63. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 177 (1994) ("[T]he text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and
abet a 10(b) violation. .. . [T]hat conclusion resolves the case.").
64. See Kuehnle, supra note 6, at 316 (asserting that Congress recognized that
secondary liability for fraud was part of the common law and that logic dictates that
Congress did not intend to contract liability, and further suggesting that Congress' failure
to expressly exclude this liability favors its application).
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comprehensive historical analysis of the law as it existed in 1934 and
writes:
In 1934, aiding or aiding and abetting were not viewed as separate,
lesser wrongs that might not justify imposition of liability, and
Congress simply would not have considered them as such....
Participation in a tort made a defendant a joint tortfeasor, and joint
tortfeasors were equally liable in the eyes of the law....
It is undeniable that, given the state of the law in 1934, a Congress
contemplating a private right of action absolutely must have expected
liability to be visited upon defendants [assisting in securities fraud]. 65
Professor Prentice concludes that the Court made an error in Central
Bank, which it compounded further in Stoneridge by defining primary
liability narrowly. 6 6
Other securities scholars have also suggested that the subsequent
overhaul of the securities laws by Congress that did not expressly
exclude aiding and abetting liability when Congress knew well that
courts were applying it constituted Congressional affirmation of the
doctrine. Yet another early commentator persuasively advocated for
aiding and abetting liability:
A barring of secondary liability would be a rejection of long-
recognized principles and would produce, contrary to the purpose of
the federal securities laws, investor protections that in many cases
would be less than existed at common law. The statutory controlling
person provisions were not intended to preclude other forms of
secondary liability, but were intended to provide an additional basis
of liability to control misconduct that otherwise might not be
covered.68
Thus, policy arguments twenty years ago favored the imposition of
liability for participating in fraud, and the law of the land actually was
that aiding and abetting violations of securities laws would subject one to
civil liability in private actions. 6 The Circuits were split as to the extent
65. Prentice, supra note 6, at 629.
66. Id. at 682-83.
67. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 54, at 516 (suggesting that Congressional
silence on aiding and abetting when it overhauled securities laws knowing that courts
were applying it constituted ratification). See also Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 197 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he available evidence suggests congressional approval of aider and
abettor liability in private § 10(b) actions. In its comprehensive revision of the Exchange
Act in 1975, Congress left untouched the sizable body of case law approving aiding and
abetting liability in private actions. . . .").
68. Kuehnle, supra note 6, at 376.
69. See, e.g., Nathan F. Coco, Comment, Has Legislative History Become History?:
A Critical Examination of Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
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and scope of aiding and abetting securities fraud liability, but there was
no split as to its existence. 7 0 The landscape changed completely in 1994
with the still shocking decision in Central Bank.71
C. The Demise ofAiding and Abetting Liability
Central Bank involved the following fact pattern. A public
authority issued bonds in the public market to finance building
improvements. 72 Central Bank of Denver served as the indenture trustee
for the bonds. The bonds were backed by collateral in the form of real
property, and the bond indenture required that the value of the property
be worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding principal and interest. 74
The bond covenants required the developer to give Central Bank an
annual report with evidence that the 160% test was satisfied. In
January of 1988, the developer provided Central Bank with an updated
land appraisal of the collateral securing the bonds issued in 1986 and
proposed to secure new bonds for 1988 issuance.76 Central Bank
realized that the 1988 appraisal showed the land values had not changed
much since 1986 but knew that property values in the area had been
falling.n
Knowing that the appraisal was stale and optimistic, Central Bank
decided that a new appraisal should be conducted, but subsequently
decided to delay the appraisal until the end of the year, six months after
Denver, N.A., 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 555, 561 (1995) ("It is remarkable that the majority
was willing, if not eager, to unabashedly cast aside the principle of stare decisis to vacate
an aiding and abetting doctrine that had been upheld in every circuit for several
decades.").
70. Id.
71. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 196-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court
for changing a firmly established legal construction of § 10(b)). See also Douglas M.
Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now Often Fatal,
Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 11 (1996)
("[In Central Bank] [t]he Supreme Court reversed twenty-five years of reliance on the
common-law construct of aiding and abetting by lower federal courts to hold collateral
participants to securities transactions secondarily liable."); James D. Cox, Just Deserts
for Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 519, 545 (1996)
("The Supreme Court discarded a doctrine that had not only been accepted by all the
circuits but had matured and become predictable, and there was no evidence the doctrine
had created mischief in its wake."); Steinberg, supra note 31, at 489-90 ("The Court's
decision swept away decades of lower court precedent that nearly universally recognized
the propriety of such secondary liability under the statue and rule.").
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the June closing on the 1988 bonds.7 8 After the 1988 bonds were issued
and before a new appraisal was completed, the borrower defaulted on the
1988 bonds.79 Plaintiffs sought to hold Central Bank liable for aiding
and abetting the borrower's fraud by delaying its independent evaluation
of the value of the collateral until after the new bonds were issued.80 The
trial court granted summary judgment for Central Bank, but the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.81
In a decision that literally shocked the securities bar,82 the Supreme
Court reversed and held that there is no liability for aiding and abetting
securities laws. The decision ignored decades of precedent in all
federal circuits and discarded a well-established doctrine without any
evidence that the doctrine was causing mischief.84 Indeed, subsequent
financial scandals of enormous magnitude suggest that the doctrine was
working to promote integrity and ethical behavior in the public
markets. The Court reasoned that because Congress did not expressly
provide for aiding and abetting liability in the express causes of action
given in the securities laws, there was no aiding and abetting liability for
either express or implied causes of action.8 6 The Court further reasoned
that there was no applicable body of federal common law and that
"Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting
statute.. .. "
The decision stunned the securities bar because it was so
overreaching it addressed questions that the petitioner did not even put
before the Court.88 Even the petitioner assumed that a private cause of




82. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 31, at 489 ("In a decision that delighted 'deep
pockets,' shocked the plaintiffs' bar, and befuddled neutral observers, the Supreme
Court . .. held that aiding and abetting liability in private actions may not be imposed
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") or under
rule 1Ob-5.") (internal citations omitted).
83. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
84. See id at 199-201 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court is lopping off
rights that have been recognized for decades without suggesting that the doctrine caused
any deleterious effects).
85. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 288-90 (arguing that Central Bank contributed to an
increase in auditor acquiescence of financial fraud); Murdock, supra note 17, at 167
("[T]he elimination of the accountability imposed by aiding and abetting liability,
arguably [contributed] to the dereliction of responsibility by accountants and lawyers
later in the decade. . . . Arthur Andersen went from a paragon of virtue at the start of the
1990s to an indicted felon at the start of the 2000s.").
86. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177.
87. Id. at 182.
88. Id. at 194-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
450 [Vol. 116:2
IMPROVING THE CULTURE OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
action for aiding and abetting securities fraud existed.89 The petitioner
merely challenged whether the action could be applied in a case of
recklessness or negligence without actual intent.90 A large volume of
commentary criticized the decision, and even symposia were held on the
case. 91 The criticism of the decision was largely a reiteration of what
was stated in the dissent by four justices and authored by Justice Stevens:
In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every
Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded
that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule
lob-5.... While we have reserved decision on the legitimacy of the
theory in two cases that did not present it, all 11 Courts of Appeals to
have considered the question have recognized a private cause of
action against aiders and abettors under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 92
The dissent continues with the argument that the reasons given by
the majority against construing a private cause of action are not sufficient
to take away a long held and firmly established right that fits comfortably
within the statutory scheme. 93 Justice Stevens suggests that judicial
restraint would favor not acting to take away rights under established
law, and that it should be up to Congressional action to legislate changes
in established law.9 4 Finally, as a matter of policy, the dissent also notes
that the SEC had used aiding and abetting liability as an important tool in
its enforcement arsenal for deterring fraud, and the majority
unambiguously removed that tool from the SEC.95
This far overreaching majority decision in Central Bank-that
aiding and abetting securities fraud is not illegal-was so offensive that
in a rare move Congress legislatively changed the law.9 6 In passing the
89. Id at 194.
90. Id
91. See, e.g., Therese H. Maynard, Central Bank: The Methodology, The Message,
and The Future, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1995) ("In the spring of 1994, the Supreme
Court handed down a bombshell of an opinion in Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank.... The Supreme Court's Central Bank opinion sparked an intense response from
all quarters that even addressed issues beyond the Supreme Court's narrow holding.").
Even after fifteen years, commentators continue to analyze and criticize the decision.
Murdock, supra note 17, at 163-67. In particular, note the harsh comment, "The
reasoning is actually embarrassing." Id. at 164.
92. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id at 196-97.
94. Id. at 198.
95. Id. at 200.
96. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158
(2008) ("The decision in Central Bank led to calls for Congress to create an express
cause of action for the SEC to bring enforcement actions for aiding and abetting within
the Securities Exchange Act. . . . Congress . . . directed prosecution of aiders and abettors
by the SEC.").
2011] 451
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the "PSLRA"), Congress
expressly provided that aiding and abetting violations of the securities
law is illegal and enforceable by the SEC.9 7 The exact words of the
Congressional Act include,
[A]ny person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial
assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this title [15
U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.], or of any rule or regulation issued under this
title [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.], shall be deemed to be in violation of
such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such
assistance is provided.98
Unfortunately for defrauded investors, the PSLRA only clearly imposed
liability in actions brought by the SEC.99  Whether the reform re-
established the availability of aiding and abetting claims for private party
litigation remained a matter of some debate. 00
On the one hand, the fact that Congress expressly made aiding and
abetting violations of the securities laws illegal and punishable by the
SEC could be interpreted as an argument that Congress did not intend to
give the right to private individuals to recover.o However, this could be
giving too much weight to inaction by Congress. 10 2  By the time the
PSLRA was passed, lower courts had begun interpreting primary liability
broadly and imposing liability on collateral agents who substantially
participated in a scheme to defraud. 0 3 Thus, Congress did not need to
expressly create a remedy for private investors. 104 However, the
Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank had brought into question
whether the SEC was also prohibited from pursuing individuals that
aided and abetted securities fraud. 0 5 Congress needed to act to clarify
this problem.1 06  Arguably, by expressly making aiding and abetting
97. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 109 Stat. 737, 757
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006)).
98. Id.
99. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 163 ("[W]e give weight to Congress' amendment to
the Act restoring aiding and abetting liability in certain cases but not others.").
100. See Klock, supra note 14, at 322 (discussing arguments for and against inferring
the availability of private enforcement against expressly illegal conduct).
101. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158.
102. See Prentice, supra note 6, at 648-51 (discussing reasons that legislative silence
on private remedies should not be interpreted as an intent to limit private remedies).
103. Id at 648-49.
104. Id. at 649.
105. See STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 762 ("After Central Bank of Denver, many
observers believed that the decision's rationale extended to SEC enforcement actions.").
106. See Cox, supra note 71, at 537 ("The Reform Act confirms the SEC's authority
to judicially prosecute knowing aiders and abettors. . . . Not to have so acted would have
seriously undercut the regulatory balance Congress had recently created within the SEC
enforcement arsenal. . . .").
452 [Vol. 116:2
IMPROVING THE CULTURE OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
securities fraud illegal in enforcement actions by the SEC and remaining
silent on the question of private actions, Congress could have meant to
provide private plaintiffs the ability to recover from aiders and abettors,
or those who substantially participated in a scheme.'0 7 However, the
Court resolved the question in 2008 in yet another far overreaching
decision that effectively immunized a broad class of undefined
individuals from private liability in securities fraud.'08
D. Stoneridge-Further Squashing Private Actions
Stoneridge was widely proclaimed to be the Roe v. Wade of
securities law.' 09 The facts of the case are complicated, but easy to
summarize. Charter Communications was the fourth largest cable
company in the U.S. and an S&P 500 firm trading on the NYSE with a
large equity capitalization of several billion dollars.110 Analysts had
projected Charter's annual earnings to be in the neighborhood of twenty
million dollars higher than what Charter's officers thought they would
make.' When the officers of Charter realized that their earnings would
fall significantly short of analyst estimates, they devised a plan to inflate
reported earnings and fool their auditors.112
Charter had been purchasing set-top cable boxes from vendors such
as Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.1 3 Charter proposed that they would
overpay $20 for each of the boxes bought for the remainder of the year,
but in exchange the companies would return this overpayment to Charter
in the form of "purchasing" advertising from Charter." 4  This would
increase Charter's revenue enough to meet the earnings expectations.'
There would not be an offsetting expense in Charter's financial
statements because at the new higher cost, Charter would treat the
107. See Prentice, supra note 6, at 649-51 (arguing that Congress sought to expand
investor protection in 1995 and recognized private rights of action as an essential
component of investor confidence and market integrity).
108. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158
(2008) (holding that there is no implied private right of action against mere aiders and
abettors notwithstanding the PSLRA).
109. Nicholas Rummell, Supremes to Weigh in on Vendor Liability for Fraud, FIN.
WK., Oct. 8, 2007, at 1.
1 10. Charter Communications, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2010),
available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NjcyOTF
8Q2hpbGRJRD0tNXxUeXBPTM=&t--1 (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
111. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 153.
112. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down: A Critical Essay on Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 448,
449 (2009).
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purchases as capital expenditures rather than expense items and would
accordingly depreciate the cost charges over time. 116 Although these
transactions were a wash and should have been treated as such, Charter's
officers and the officers of their vendor corporations drafted separate
documents relating to the price change and the advertising revenue and
backdated some of these so as to create the appearance of independence
in the transactions and fool the auditors of Charter. 17  When the
subsequent financial fraud was discovered, investors that lost money
brought suit and included Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola as defendants
in the action.118
The district court dismissed the claim against Charter's vendors in a
motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.1 19 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to
consider the case and also affirmed in a five to three decision.120 The
three dissenting justices would have reversed on the theory that the
knowingly fraudulent conduct by the respondents was a but for cause of
the financial fraud and made them primarily liable jointly with Charter
for using a "deceptive device" prohibited by § 10b of the Securities
Exchange Act.1 2 1 However, the majority concluded that the respondents
were at most aiders and abettorsl2 2 and, therefore, not liable because
there is no private right of action against aiders and abettors.123
Critical commentary sided with the dissent and accused the majority
of overreaching to find no primary liability solely to stomp out any
remaining life in aiding and abetting liability.1 24 The majority's rationale
for finding no primary liability was that the vendors made no fraudulent
representations to the shareholders of Charter. 125 This is true, but as the
116. Id.
117. Id. at 154-55.
118. Id. at 155.
119. Id
120. Id. at 151.
121. Id at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 166-67.
123. Id at 158.
124. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 6, at 683 ("The Central Bank/Stoneridge holding
that collateral parties who knowingly participate in fraudulent schemes are merely
'secondary' parties who cannot be held liable is utterly inconsistent with every relevant
body of fraud law in existence in 1934."); Sinai, supra note 60, at 173 ("The dissent in
Stoneridge made clear that the majority had based its views on 'faulty premises."');
Klock, supra note 14, at 327 ("The Stoneridge majority has created a contrived
distinction for the purpose of eliminating liability by the perpetrator of a but-for cause of
the securities fraud. The distinction between preparing the financial statements and
providing the sham transactions upon which the financial statements were based is
arbitrary and whimsical.") (footnote omitted); Murdock, supra note 17, at 207 ("In his
dissent, Justice Stevens took the majority to task.").
125. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166-67.
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dissenters point out, the decision creates a new super-causation
requirement under § lOb. 12 6 According to the majority, investors have no
claim against Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola because their fraudulent
communications went to Charter's auditors and not to Charter's
shareholders.12 7  This is a ridiculous distinction since the fraudulent
financial statements would not have entered the marketplace if not for
the fraudulent documentation by the respondents.12 8  The majority's
reasoning and finding are contrary to Congressional intent to provide
broad remedial legislation designed to deter fraud, assist victimized
investors, and install confidence in the integrity of the marketplace. 12 9
Having decided that the respondents were not primarily liable under
§ 10(b) because the fraudulent activity took place in the market for goods
and services rather than the market for securities, the majority then had a
platform to rule that aiding and abetting violations of the federal
securities laws does not create liability to private plaintiffs.130 The Court
first cited its holding in Central Bank that § 10(b) does not extend
liability to aiders and abettors.131 The Court next observed that Congress
reacted to Central Bank by expressly making aiding and abetting a
violation of the federal securities laws actionable in proceedings brought
by the SEC. 132 The Court interpreted this as an intention not to provide a
private right of action against aiding and abetting a violation of the
federal securities laws. 13 3  As a result, investors will have no remedy
against this type of misconduct unless they can persuade the SEC to use
126. Id. at 168 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 160 (stating that acts designed to assist fooling auditors about the
revenue that becomes disclosed in public filings are too remote to support investor
reliance on the deceptive acts).
128. See Klock, supra note 14, at 326-27 (discussing the connection between product
market transactions and financial market prices); Murdock, supra note 17, at 206
("Financial statements are not some abstraction, of value in and of themselves. Financial
statements only have value to the extent they accurately reflect the underlying
transactions.").
129. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In light of the history
of court-created remedies and specifically the history of implied causes of action under
§ 10(b), the Court is simply wrong when it states that Congress did not impliedly
authorize this private cause of action 'when it first enacted the statute."').
130. See Prentice, supra note 6, at 651 (explaining that because the Stoneridge
defendants were involved in such blatant fraud, the majority could not merely label them
aiders and abettors without first ruling erroneously that the investors did not rely on the
defendants' acts); Klock, supra note 14, at 333 ("In order to have the opportunity to limit
the language [of the PSLRA] providing for secondary liability, it was necessary for the
Court to reach the conclusion that there was insufficient causal connection between the
conduct and the fraud in the financial market.").
131. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157.
132. See id. at 158.
133. Id.
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its limited enforcement resources to pursue aiding and abetting
violations.134
The SEC's ability to pursue aiders and abettors of securities fraud
was no consolation to the investors of Charter. Not only did the SEC not
prosecute Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta for aiding and abetting fraud,
even though the defendants were obviously culpable, but the United
States actually filed an amicus brief on behalf of the less than ethical
defendants arguing against private action civil liability.' 35 So much for
the notion that one role of government is to protect its citizens. It is also
worth noting that the SEC's limited resources were not sufficient to
detect the sixty billion dollar Madoff fraud conducted over two decades
even when the evidence was gift wrapped and delivered to them. 13 6 This
will be discussed further in Part V. Clearly, without a private right of
action there is no incentive for corporations to avoid the type of unethical
behavior engaged in by Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta.,3 7
After the decision in Stoneridge, Senator Carl Levin criticized the
Court's policy and called on Congress to change the law.,38  Senator
Levin stated:
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court determined that shareholders are
barred by federal law from suing third parties that help public
companies commit fraud, and must instead rely on federal regulators
to punish wrongdoing and recover funds. Given limited federal
resources, however, that ruling means, in too many cases, banks,
accounting firms, lawyers and others will be able to aid and abet
corporate fraud, and shareholders will have no legal recourse. That
isn't fair, and it undermines investor confidence in U.S. markets. 139
134. Id.
135. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 522 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL
2329639.
136. See generally Rhee, supra note 4, at 363-84 and Klock, supra note 4, at 784-819
(describing and analyzing the failure of the SEC to uncover Madoff's fraud).
137. See, e.g., Murdock, supra note 17, at 134-35. Professor Murdock asserts:
[C]ourts and legislatures . . . are biased in favor of management; moreover that
their failure to hold management to account has emboldened management to
engage in illicit behavior and has led to supineness, or worse, by gatekeepers,
such as accountants and boards of directors. The willingness of federal courts
to disregard blatant corruption and give crooks a free pass by engaging in
outcome determinative decision making and strained interpretations of the
law....
Id.
138. Where Were Watchdogs? Financial Crises and Breakdown of Financial
Governance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov. Affairs, 111 h
Cong. 354-355 (Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, Perm.
Subcomm. on Investigations).
139. Id. at 354.
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Unfortunately, Senator Levin's proposal has not been acted on.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF CENTRAL BANK-AN EPIDEMIC OF
FINANCIAL SCANDALS
A. Review of the Enron Fraud
The beginning of the new millennium was accompanied by an
epidemic of financial scandals that received high visibility and generated
many calls for reform and historical analysis. 14 0  AOL, Halliburton,
WorldCom, Qwest, Tyco, AIG, Parmalat, and many other well-known
large corporations were caught in accounting scandals misstating costs,
14114revenues and earnings.11 The largest among all of these was Enron.14 2
Enron was a large energy company that began developing new
products and experienced rapid growth.143 As the stock market came to
capitalize Enron's growth into the price of the shares, pressure to
maintain the growth increased.144  This led to aggressive and risky
investments, some of which did not go well.14 5 Enron set up derivatives
positions with phony companies in order to hide their losses. 146
Meanwhile, their losses grew and became more difficult to hide.14 7
Eventually, the dam broke and company officials and consultants and
140. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 269-71 (observing the explosion of scandals
occurring around 2001-2002 and noting that scandals tend to create legislation).
141. See, e.g., Faith Stevelman, Corporate Governance Five Years After Sarbanes-
Oxley: Is there Real Change?: Foreword, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 475, 481 n.29 (2005).
142. Klock, supra note 10, at 69 n.1.
143. Newby v. Enron Corp., 394 F.3d 296, 299 (5th Cir. 2004).
144. See Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons From a Perfect Storm
of Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W.
L. REv. 163, 172-73 (2003) (describing the pressure on Enron resulting in creative
accounting).
145. See Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron:
Corporate (Re)Regulation after the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J.
35, 91 (2005) (describing Enron's aggressive business practices and collapse).
146. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915, 928-29 (2003).
147. Two reporters described Enron's troubles:
[A]s Enron's trading expanded, its other businesses underperformed. Its debt
and cash needs kept growing, so the company needed to make more and bigger
"structured transactions" to keep the game going-pledging increasing amounts
of stock. Enron's strategy began to resemble what members of Congress would
later call a high-tech Ponzi scheme.
April Witt & Peter Behr, Visionary's Dream Led to Risky Business: Opaque Deals,
Accounting Sleight of Hand Built an Energy Giant and Ensured Its Demise, WASH. POST,
July 28, 2002, at AO1.
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auditors for Arthur Anderson were caught shredding documents in a last
minute effort to destroy evidence of blatant criminal fraud.14 8
Investors lost billions of dollars.14 9 Many lawsuits were filed.150 As
Enron and Arthur Anderson went into bankruptcy, plaintiffs naturally
looked to other culpable deep pockets for recovery. One extremely
visible case provided an illustrative example of one of Enron's egregious
frauds. The University of California's Board of Regents had invested
heavily in Enron and was the lead plaintiff in a class-action against
defendants including Merrill Lynch.' 5' In a transaction now known as
the Nigerian Barges Transaction, Enron hid significant bad assets on its
books and obtained a large amount of cash in an unprofitable deal that
dressed up the corporate financial statements.15 2 The company "sold"
Nigerian registered barges to Merrill Lynch with a promise to buy them
back in six months at a profit to Merrill Lynch.153  The economic
substance of such a transaction is a loan of cash by Merrill Lynch to
Enron secured by the barges as collateral, with a profitable interest rate
on the loan for Merrill.154 However, rather than book the transaction as a
loan, it was recorded as a sale of assets; this procedure removed bad
assets and increased cash which effectively made Enron appear to have
more liquidity and less debt than was actually the case.'5 5
Knowing that aiding and abetting securities fraud did not provide a
strong legal theory for recovery, the plaintiffs' lawyers sought to recover
under a theory of scheme liability.'16 This theory proposed that Merrill
Lynch played such an important role in the scheme to defraud Enron
investors that Merrill should also be held liable as a primary violator.'57
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held otherwise.5  In
148. See April Witt & Peter Behr, Losses, Conflicts Threaten Survival: CFO Fastow
Ousted In Probe ofProfits, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at AO1 (describing the document
shredding).
149. See David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a
Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEo. L.J. 61, 64 (2003) (describing the magnitude of losses
and stock price movements).
150. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting one
law firm's consolidation of numerous private plaintiff securities law civil actions into
several certified class actions).
151. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos., Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th
Cir., 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1170 (2008).




156. See id at 378 (describing district court's finding in support of plaintiffs legal
theory).
157. See id. at 377 ("Plaintiffs allege that the banks knew exactly why Enron was
engaging in seemingly irrational transactions ....
158. Id at 394.
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reasoning that might well have been borrowed by the five Supreme Court
Justices in their subsequent Stoneridge opinion, the Fifth Circuit held
that Merrill Lynch's conduct was not covered under the securities laws
because their actions were not something that investors in an efficient
market could be presumed to have relied on.159
B. Market Efficiency and Fraud-on-the-Market Reliance
This super-causation argument suggests a misunderstanding of
market efficiency and fraud-on-the-market reliance.' 60  In an efficient
market, prices reflect all relevant available information, which certainly
includes a corporation's most recent financial statements.'6 1  If one
engages in a fraud that provides the basis for creating fraudulent
financial statements, that certainly violates the plain language of both
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.1 6 2  The argument that since Merrill did not
actually write the financial statements or disseminate them and therefore
cannot have any liability to injured investors strains standard legal
reasoning in torts, contracts, and criminal law.' 63
The text of Rule lOb-5 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce... :
a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
... or
c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon an Jperson,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
159. Id. at 385-86.
160. See Klock, supra note 14, at 325-27 (explaining the connection between fraud in
transactions upon which financial reports are based and market prices).
161. See, e.g., Mark Klock, Are Wastefulness and Flamboyance Really Virtues? Use
and Abuse of Economic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 181, 198 (2002) ("The most
prevalent definition of market efficiency is that prices quickly and fully incorporate all
available information.").
162. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the fraud was prohibited as a "deceptive
device" under the statute); see also Klock, supra note 14, at 323-24 (stating that the fraud
is prohibited under the plain language of the statute).
163. See generally Klock, supra note 14, at 322-30 (discussing problems with the
Court's reasoning and understanding of financial markets and the economy).
164. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
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Additionally, it must be observed that the authority for the creation of
Rule lOb-5 is § 10(b), which makes it unlawful to use any means of
interstate commerce directly or indirectly:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest for the protection of investors.165
The conduct of entities such as Merrill Lynch in the Nigerian Barge
transaction with Enron, or Motorola in its fraudulent documentation of
wash transactions with Charter Communications clearly falls within the
plain language of terms such as scheme to defraud or operating a deceit
upon a person. 166 Even Central Bank's failure to update an outdated
appraisal could reasonably be construed to be a "course of business
which operates . . . as a fraud. ... 167 The potential weakness in claims
against such actors is the language, "in connection with the purchase or
sale." The Court has limited this language. For example, in Merrill
Lynch v. Shadi Dabit, 6 8 the Court stated that the fraud must coincide
with a securities transaction. 169 In Stoneridge, the Court denied recovery
because the fraud took place in the market for goods and services and not
in the market for securities.170
This distinction between the market for goods and services and the
market for securities has no foundation in economic reality and is
inconsistent with both old and more recent Supreme Court decisions.
The economic reality is that the price of securities transacted in the
public market is based on the fundamental value that investors see in
future profits, which is based on publicly available information about the
corporation's level of business, customer base, and similar factors.1 7 2
165. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2009).
166. See, e.g., Klock, supra note 14, at 323-24 (discussing why the fraudulent acts fall
within the plain language of the prohibition).
167. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c). See, e.g., Klock, supra note 14, at 319 ("Although
Central Bank did not actively participate in the fraud, its conduct could be found to be
reckless and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Central Bank could be
liable....").
168. Merrill Lynch v. Shadi Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
169. Id. at 85.
170. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166-67
(2008).
171. See generally Prentice, supra note 6, at 615-76 (describing inconsistencies in the
Court's decisions regarding liability for participating in securities fraud).
172. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE
142-48 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the valuation of stock and explaining the effects of
alternative growth rates and the difficulty in estimating future growth); BURTON G.
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Fraud in the market for goods and services introduces misinformation in
the securities markets and thereby affects the prices in securities
transactions coincidentally with the fraud. 73 In Basic v. Levinson,174 the
Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory whereby plaintiffs could
prove reliance on the misrepresentations based on the fact that the
fraudulent information was disseminated in the market, and in an
efficient market the market price incorporates all information.'75
Therefore, the prices at which securities transactions are occurring are
influenced by the misinformation that was introduced into the market.
The Court's Stoneridge argument that fraud occurring in the product
market is too remote to affect security prices ignores the economic
reality that liquid financial markets rapidly incorporate information about
economic activity in the product market.176
The fraud on the market theory was again upheld more recently in
the 1997 decision U.S. v. O'Hagan.17 7 O'Hagan was a partner in a law
firm representing a client corporation about to make a tender offer for
another corporation.178 O'Hagan used the inside information to purchase
shares and call options on more shares in the target before the
information was public and he profited by more than four million
dollars. 179 The SEC then brought charges for violation of § 10(b).s 0 The
controversy around the case was ostensibly about the viability of the
misappropriation theory whereby the exploitation of confidential
information belonging to someone to whom a duty is owed is a basis for
liability.' 8 ' The Court held that it is, but in doing so it effectively
MALKEIL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 96-103 (7th ed. 1999) (describing the
fundamental determinants of stock prices).
173. Klock, supra note 14, at 326-27.
174. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
175. Id. at 246-47.
176. See Ivo WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE 350 (2009) ("Almost all financial
economists, regardless of camp, believe in basic market efficiency for large markets and
liquid securities. No respectable economist believes that it is easy to get very rich trading
on easily available information.").
177. Specifically, the Court implied that investors are entitled to rely on the accuracy
of the market price as incorporating all public information because insiders trading
illegally on material private information are committing a fraud. See United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997) ("A misappropriator who trades on the basis of
material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through
deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members
of the investing public.").
178. Id. at 647.
179. Id. at 647-48.
180. Id at 648.
181. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court
Misappropriates The Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1157-59
(1997) (summarizing controversy around O'Hagan and misappropriation theory).
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affirmed the fraud-on-the-market theory.1 82  The price for which the
defendant bought the securities was based on the market valuation of all
publicly available information.183  The defendant's use of confidential
private information that he had obtained from a client of the firm gave
him an unfair advantage and constituted a fraud on the market since
participants in the market would not knowingly trade against investors
with such an informational advantage.184
C. Participating in Fraud Establishes a Duty
The Court has repeatedly held that to be liable for fraud there must
be a breach of duty.185 In Chiarella v. United States,'8 6 the Court held
that liability based on § 10(b) must be based on breach of a duty and that
duty arises from a specific relationship between parties.187  The Court
explained:
Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold
that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information. 188
The Court further limited the situations in which a defendant could
be found to have breached a duty under § 10(b) in the case of Dirks v.
SEC. 189 The Court held that tippees trading on material and confidential
inside information cannot be liable unless the tipsters are liable, and for
the tipster to be liable there must have been an expectation of a personal
benefit when conveying the information. 190 Justice Powell wrote:
182. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 ("The misappropriation theory is thus designed to
'protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by "outsiders" to a
corporation who have access to confidential information that will affect the corporation's
security price when revealed . . . .' (quoting Brief of the United States at 14, O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642 (No. 96-842), 1997 WL 86306)).
183. See id. at 658-59 ("An investor's information disadvantage vis-A-vis a
misappropriator with material, nonpublic information stems from contrivance, not luck; it
is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.").
184. Id. at 659; see also Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case for
Prohibiting Insider Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 329-332 (1994) (explaining the
economics underlying investors' refusal to knowingly trade against better informed
investors).
185. See STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 861 (referencing Court decisions that assert
that liability for violating § 10(b) must be based on breach of a duty to disclose).
186. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
187. Id. at 230.
188. Id at 234-35.
189. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983).
190. Id. at 661.
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[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when
the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach.191
In Stoneridge the Court held that Motorola and the other defendants
did not have a duty to the shareholders of Charter.' 92 Unfortunately, the
Court only considered half of the theory of duty.'93 The half the Court
considered was duty created by relationship. The officers of Charter had
a duty to the shareholders arising out of their agency relationship, and it
is true that the officers of Motorola had no relationship with the
shareholders of Charter that would give rise to a duty. However, duty
can also be established by an affirmative act.' 94  An individual who
pushes a small child into a deep pool has a duty to rescue him.195
Creating an appearance of real economic activity in wash transactions
while falsely backdating documents to make the transactions appear
independent is an affirmative act of fraud, even if in the goods and
services market, that creates a duty to correct the misinformation
introduced into the financial market.1 96
The erosion of investor protection under federal securities laws
presents the possibility that more fraud actions will migrate to state
court. 1 Although the Uniform Standards Act of 1998 attempted to
insulate corporations from securities class actions in state courts, the
Delaware carve-out exception provided that investors are not prohibited
from claims based on a breach of fiduciary duty.198 Providing
shareholders misinformation even in the absence of a duty to disclose is a
breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law.199 Delaware law also
recognizes aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty.200
"Fragmented state protection in a national market is undesirable and
191. Id.
192. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159
(2008).
193. Cf Klock, supra note 14, at 328 ("The Court also insincerely characterized the
case as one involving lack of a duty of disclosure on the part of the vendors and
customers of Charter.").
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. d (1965).
195. Id
196. Cf Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden Reef? Navigating the Fiduciary Duty of
Delaware Corporations' Directors in the Wake of Malone, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN., 18-
19 (2000) (discussing the duty not to deceive in the absence of a duty to disclose).
197. See, e.g., id. at 4.
198. See generally id. at 33-36 (discussing the "Delaware carve-out" exemption).
199. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998).
200. Id. at 15.
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requires congressional action with leadership and support by the new
President." 2 0 1
D. Removing Liability Removes Incentives for Ethical Behavior
The decisions in Stoneridge and Regents of the University of
California also are at odds with older decisions such as Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston. In that decision, the plaintiffs had an express
cause of action under § 11 of the Securities Act for false information in a
registration statement, but pleaded a cause of action for violation of § 10
20of the Securities Exchange Act.202 The Court allowed the action holding
that:
[I]t is hardly a novel proposition that the Securities Exchange Act and
the Securities Act "prohibit some of the same conduct." . . . In
savings clauses included in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress
rejected the notion that the express remedies of the securities laws
would preempt all other rights of action.203
The point of this passage is that at one time the Court held that a
"cumulative construction of the securities laws . .. furthers their broad
remedial purpose."204 However, without ever squarely addressing the
inconsistency, the Court's more recent decisions have sought to restrict
and limit private actions for securities fraud.205 It is an unlikely
coincidence that subsequent to the rule set down in Central Bank we
have witnessed an increase in securities fraud as measured by the number
and magnitude of large financial scandals from Enron to Madoff and
everything in between.2 06
Professor John Coffee constructed a careful historical analysis of
the avalanche of financial scandals that hit our markets.2 07 He notes that
most commentators attribute the wave to a decline in business morality,
201. Klock, supra note 14, at 330.
202. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381-83 (1983).
203. Id. at 383.
204. Id. at 386.
205. See, e.g., Murdock, supra note 17, at 134-36 (suggesting that the Supreme Court
has strained legal reasoning to reach decisions that are biased in favor of corporate
management).
206. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 288-290 (discussing how Central Bank contributed
to a reduction in legal liability risk for accountants, corporate counsel, and underwriters
and actually resulted in a dramatic drop in claims against them); Murdock, supra note 17,
at 167 (linking the Central Bank decision to subsequent financial scandals involving
accountants and lawyers).
207. See generally Coffee, supra note 9, at 269-309 (providing "a capsule social and
economic history of the 1990s" that led to the explosion of financial scandals in 2001-
2002).
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but he observes that this is a somewhat circular explanation. 20 8 Professor
Coffee provides his own deeper analysis that attributes the scandals to
many factors. 2 09  Like an economist, Professor Coffee proclaims,
"Perverse incentives, not declines in ethics, cause scandals." 210 Chief
among Coffee's list of perverse incentives is the fact that corporate
officers became more heavily compensated with corporate equity which
incentivized officers to become more attentive to current stock price and
less concerned with long-run performance.211 Although this shift in
compensation could be a factor, I discount this explanation because
current stock price is inherently an estimate of future performance.212
Professor Coffee also draws on the in vogue behavioral literature to
suggest that investor biases in underestimating the probabilities of
recessions played a role in pumping up market values and creating an
environment where executives felt pressured to commit fraud to maintain
prices.2 13 Again, I discount this explanation because as much as the
behavioralists would like to insist otherwise, cognitive biases cannot
drive markets away from their fundamental values.214
The real culprit in the rise of the financial scandals is the removal of
a credible deterrent to assisting in fraud.215 Central Bank declared that
208. Id. at 269-70.
209. See id. at 271-78 (attributing scandals to fundamental changes in corporate
governance including the hostile takeover and changes in executive compensation which
led to more aggressive earnings management).
210. Id. at 278.
211. Professor Coffee suggests that:
Ironically, the principal actors who destabilized the existing corporate
equilibrium were institutional investors and Congress. Institutional investors
encouraged greater use of stock options to compensate both managers and
directors in order to increase their sensitivity to the market. Congress
unintentionally hastened this process by placing a ceiling on the cash
compensation that senior executives could be paid.
Id at 274 (footnote omitted).
212. See, e.g., GORDON J. ALEXANDER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENTS 331
(3d ed. 2001) (equating the value of a stock to the discounted value of all future
dividends that are expected to be paid).
213. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 293-95 (weaving a story of how the financial
scandals could be a consequence of irrational markets, biased investors, and an
atmosphere of euphoria).
214. See Mark Klock, Contrasting the Art of Economic Science with Pseudo-
Economic Nonsense: The Distinction Between Reasonable Assumptions and Ridiculous
Assumptions, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 153, 199-202 (2010) (explaining that three basic
assumptions about market structure-market clearing, budget constraints, and limited
credit-ties the behavior of asset prices to their fundamental values independent of
assumptions about investors cognitive abilities).
215. See, e.g., Klock, supra note 14, at 352-53 (blaming the poor economy on the
pervasiveness of fraud in the markets as the result of a lack of market based incentives for
ethical behavior).
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aiding and abetting securities fraud is not actionable.216 This meant that
key gatekeepers of integrity had no incentive to disclose fraud, making it
all the easier for officers to perpetuate and sustain fraud without being
detected.217 Although the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act made
aiding and abetting fraud a violation, it made it one that could only be
pursued by the SEC.218 However, the SEC's resources are severely
limited and it cannot pursue all cases of aiding and abetting fraud.219
Furthermore, the Madoff scandal highlights the fact that the SEC is an
institution that lacks the competence to detect fraud even when
investigators have been presented with tips and detailed evidence. 2 20 The
position of sixteen former high-level SEC officials in their amicus curiae
brief for the Stoneridge defendants further indicates that relying on the
agency to act against aiders and abettors of fraud is a poor bet.221
Furthermore, the PSLRA erected major procedural obstacles to
1 22securities class actions further inhibiting private litigation.22 The
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act also limited the ability of
defrauded investors to pursue remedies in state courts.223 Additionally,
in Stoneridge, the Court introduced a super-causation requirement that
the fraud could not merely be a but-for proximate cause but needed to
involve the actual security transaction or a direct communication to
investors, as opposed to a misrepresentation to an auditor who then
216. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 190-91 (1994).
217. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 288-290 (describing the role of Central Bank in
reducing the risk of gatekeepers being sued).
218. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158
(2008).
219. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 15-
16 (1991) (statement of SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden) ("[T]he Commission does
not have adequate resources to detect and prosecute all violations of the federal securities
laws. .. .").
220. See Klock, supra note 4, at 785 ("[T]he SEC should have known Madoff's Ponzi
scheme was afloat years earlier. . . . [T]he SEC staff did not competently handle their
investigations ... ); Rhee, supra note 4, at 375 ("For the SEC in this case, it could not
detect fraud even though it was spelled out in explicit terms.").
221. See Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law and Finance
Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Stoneridge, 522 U.S. 148 (2008)
(No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329639 (listing sixteen former SEC officials (three chairs, eleven
commissioners, and two general counsels) arguing for the defendants and against the
plaintiffs seeking recovery from participants in securities fraud).
222. See generally Branson, supra note 71, at 3-41 (describing the procedural hurdles
created by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
223. See generally Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal
Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 1-13, 32-
35 (1998) (describing the difficulties that plaintiffs in securities cases face after the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998).
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224
passes the misinformation along to investors. As Professor Prentice
stated on Stoneridge, "the Court committed an anachronistic error
comparable to a cowboy movie showing John Wayne listening to an iPod
as he rides his horse across the Old West." 2 2 5 Professor Prentice draws
this analogy because the distinction between primary and secondary tort
liability did not develop until a 1966 case, long after the securities laws
were enacted.2 26 Under the law as it existed in 1934, the defendants in
Stoneridge would have been considered joint tortfeasors subject to
primary liability for their knowing participation in the scheme.227 Thus,
classifying the defendants as secondary actors, for which Congress did
not provide any liability, is an anachronistic error because there was no
distinction between primary and secondary liability at the time the
228securities laws were enacted.
The cumulative effect of all these developments has been to remove
private enforcement as a deterrent and leave only the SEC.2 2 9 But given
SEC resources, aiding fraud has become a winning bet with a no-lose
outcome.230
224. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 168-
70 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's super-causation
requirement to establish reliance goes against the Court's earlier holding and discussing
this point culminating in the conclusion that: "The Court's view of the causation required
to demonstrate reliance is unwarranted and without precedent.").
225. Prentice, supra note 6, at 612.
226. Id. at 640.
227. See id. at 643-44 (explaining that the 1934 standard for liability was knowing
participation in fraud).
228. Id
229. Cf Edward Labaton, The Gatekeepers are Still Accountable Even After Central
Bank and the Contract with America, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 547, 551 (1996) ("The [PSLRA]
provides for no private right of action against aiders and abettors. It is difficult to
understand a good faith rationale for that omission. Surely public policy should allow
civil recovery against one who has aided and abetted a fraud.").
230. In a recent article I wrote:
[F]raudsters know that they have a small probability of being subjected to
enforcement actions by the SEC. They can hide in the vast market and take
their chances on isolated enforcement actions by the Commission. If they are
caught, they might have to disgorge their profits and pay a modest fine. If they
are not caught and targeted, they will reap large rewards. The gamble seems
like a pretty good one, especially for fraudsters who are likely to be much less
risk adverse than the general population.
Klock, supra note 4, at 835.
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IV. A CAVEAT ON BEHAVIORALISTS' PROPOSALS FOR PATERNALISTIC
REGULATION
A. Market Volatility Does Not Imply that Markets are Irrational or
Inefficient
A barrage of legal commentators has been bashing the efficient
market hypothesis for the past ten years based on the argument that the
volatility of the stock market demonstrates that markets are not rational
and therefore not efficient.2 3 1 For example, Professors Geoffrey Miller
and Gerald Rosenfeld argue that behavioral biases caused the financial
crisis of 2008 and justify reforms of corporate governance, regulation
and oversight, and even the education of "financial market personnel." 2 32
Frank Partnoy argues that large movements in the stock market
necessarily imply that the market is not efficient.23 3 Another illustrative
example of bashing the assumption of rationality can be found in Jeremy
Blumenthal's conclusion:
231. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Finance Theory and Accounting Fraud:
Fantastic Futures versus Conservative Histories, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 789, 798 (2005)
("Behavioral finance theory undercuts modem finance theory and explains realities that
modem finance theory cannot."); Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the
Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CoNN. L. REV. 393, 395 (2006)
("According to behavioral finance theorists, stock market bubbles are driven by 'noise
traders' who make irrational investment decisions on the basis of herding behavior and
behavioral biases."); Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV.
175, 179 (2010) ("Behavioral finance scholarship has shown that the notion that share
prices are correct rests on shaky theoretical and empirical underpinnings."); Peter Smith,
New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1456-57 (2007) ("Scholars have applied
behavioral economics to investor behavior in particular, finding many examples of
investor irrationality. In addition, scholars in the field of behavioral finance, a
subdiscipline of behavioral economics, have produced significant evidence that markets
are affected by the biases that affect individual behavior.") (citation omitted).
232. Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, An Economy In Crisis: Law, Policy, and
Morality During the Recession: Article: II. Theoretical Commentary: Intellectual
Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of
2008, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 807, 840 (2010). Since these law professors do not
provide a specific proposal, only a vague suggestion, there is no real substance to criticize
in their proposal. However, the tone of the article raises an inference that these law
professors are suggesting that lawyers should decide what theories and models finance
professors can teach. Given that the perpetuation of the Madoff Ponzi scheme is a direct
result of the failure of the legal curriculum to adequately educate lawyers in the field of
finance, this seems to be a poorly thought out suggestion.
233. See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U.
PITT. L. REV. 741, 751-52 (2000) ("It follows that the only possible explanation for large
market movements (up or down) under the EMH is as a response to new information.
However, the magnitude of market movements during times of crash is inconsistent with
this explanation."); but see Klock, supra note 161, at 215-16 (criticizing this line of
reasoning).
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There is little question that individuals do not conform well to the
rational decisionmaker model posited by traditional law and
economics. Our reasoning and decisionmaking about what is good
for us is often flawed, our ability and motivation to seek full and
unbiased information is often low, our susceptibility to manipulation
by others is often high. These cognitive failings often serve us
poorly, and legal and policy commentary has begun to turn toward
consideration of what such failings imply about the propriety of third-
party intervention to protect us from ourselves. 234
The obvious point that is brushed under the table is that just because
many decisions turn out to be regrettable mistakes is not evidence that
the decisions were bad at the time they were made.235 Of course there
are Darwin awards that are given to individuals that made obviously bad
decisions. 236 But this is the exception rather than the norm.23 7 Relatively
238Thprmfew people achieve this status. The primary reason people make poor
239
decisions in the present is that people are poor predictors of the future.
However, there is certainly nothing irrational about our inability to
234. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 70
(2007).
235. See Klock, supra note 161, at 232-33 (attributing mistakes to the difficulty in
making long term forecasts); cf Robert E. Hall, Struggling to Understand the Stock
Market, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2001). Professor Hall states:
Most suggestions of irrationality appear to deal with mistakes in probability
ratlier than mistakes in marginal utility. . . . In strictly stationary settings, the
standard is straightforward for judging whether a person's subjective
probability is correct. . . . Rational beliefs about probabilities are only loosely
constrained in a nonstationary world. An individual who believes that new
principles govern the economy will not rationally use historical data to form
beliefs about today and the future. Rather than deriving probabilities from past
experience, the individual will think through what will happen in the future.
Id.
236. See WENDY NORTHCUTT, THE DARWrN AWARDs 4 at 3 (2007) ("Darwin Award
winners plan and carry out disastrous schemes that a child can tell are a really bad idea.").
237. See id. at 5 ("The candidate must exhibit an astounding misapplication of
judgment. We are not talking about common stupidities. . . . The fatal act must be of
such idiotic magnitude that we shake our heads. . . .").
238. There were a mere ten posthumous recipients of Darwin Awards in 2010. 2010
Darwin Awards, DARWINAWARDS.COM, http://www.darwinawards.com/darwin/darwin
2010.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
239. See Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference
Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 467 (2008) ("These terms refer to
the finding that people tend to be poor predictors of their future preferences. Specifically,
we habitually underestimate the intensity of our reactions to future costs and benefits.");
Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science ofHappiness, 85
IND. L.J. 553, 575 (2010) ("Studies have shown that individuals are poor predictors of
how life events-like winning the lottery or sustaining an injury-will change their overall
life satisfaction and future affective states.").
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accurately predict what is unknown and unknowable. 2 4 0 Nor is there
anything irrational about taking a guess about what the future will be and
making a decision based on that guess.24' When the guess turns out to be
wrong, the decision will be revealed to be a mistake in hindsight, but it is
not evidence that the decision was a bad one at the time it was made
given what was unknown at that time.242
One notable voice in opposition to these behavioral law and
economics and behavioral finance scholars has been Gregory Mitchell.
Professor Mitchell is a lawyer who also has a Ph.D. in psychology.243 He
has written several articles demonstrating that the psychological research
drawn on by behavioral law and economics commentators does not
244 rigt rfso
support the conclusions that they have drawn. According to Professor
Mitchell, "Careful scrutiny of the psychological research reveals greater
adherence to norms of rationality than that implied by the legal
behavioralists, and the methodological and interpretive limitations on
this psychological research make extrapolation from experimental
settings to real world legal settings often inappropriate." 245
240. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 106 (7th ed.
1999). Professor Malkiel explains:
[T]he mathematical precision of the firm-foundation value formulas is based on
treacherous ground: forecasting the future. The major fundamentals for these
calculations are never known with certainty; they are only relatively crude
estimates-perhaps one should say guesses-about what might happen in the
future.
Id.; cf id. at 104 ("Precise figures cannot be calculated from undetermined data. It stands
to reason that you can't obtain precise figures by using indefinite factors.").
241. Cf BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE 198-99 (2004) (suggesting that
agonizing over complex decisions creates stress and those who simply make a "good
enough" choice rather than a best choice are happier).
242. Cf JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN READS THE NEWSPAPER 19 (1995)
("[P]olitical and economic matters . . . are not very predictable. . . .").
243. Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behaviorism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted
Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1907
(2002).
244. See id at 1911 ("Unfortunately, the facile way in which these scholars
summarize and then incorporate psychological research findings into legal theory ignores
important limitations on this research."); Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus
Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1781, 1783 (2003) ("I contend that legal decision theorists have placed too great an
emphasis on finding and describing behavioral tendencies toward irrationality, without
due regard for the boundary conditions on these supposed tendencies."); Gregory
Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72 (2002)
("Behavioral law and economics bases its model of bounded rationality on a very limited
set of empirical data and draws unsupportable conclusions about human nature from this
partial data set.").
245. Mitchell, supra note 243, at 1907.
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There are simple fundamental economic reasons why financial
markets are more volatile than in the 1950's. They relate to the nature of
the economy. In the past, the bulk of the economy was involved in
manufacturing and production of agricultural goods.246 The activity was
capital intensive and utilized relatively unskilled labor.2 47  The
manufacturing and agricultural sectors produced relatively predictable
cash flows backed by physical capital and real property that could easily
be seen and valued.248 The modem economy is heavily involved in
services, intellectual capital, information, and other intangibles.2 49 It is
difficult to see and value the assets of a firm working to unlock
information in the genetic code.250 We cannot easily predict whether
they will be successful in unlocking information, whether the
information will be valuable, or whether they will be able to fully
appropriate the value of that information for themselves. 2 5 1 Since we
cannot easily predict these outcomes, it is not unreasonable to expect our
252predictions to fluctuate widely.
Likewise, a large segment of the value of many modem
corporations lies in estimates regarding future growth rates.253 Cable and
cellular company values depend on estimated growth in their customer
base.254 Estimates of future growth are notoriously difficult to predict,
246. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EcoN. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
148 (1959) (showing that manufacturing and agriculture accounted for about 62% of
GDP in 1958; the service sector accounted for only about 38% of GDP in 1958).
247. Cf Victor R. Fuchs, The Determinants of the Redistribution ofManufacturing in
the United States Since 1929, 44 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167, 177 (1962) (attributing
substantial components of manufacturing growth to an abundant supply of unskilled
labor).
248. See Hall, supra note 235, at 5 (explaining that the value of hard assets is stable
and fluctuates little, and that postwar movements in financial claims are attributable to
intangibles).
249. See id. at 6 ("In recent times and in technology-using industries, corporations
have accumulated enormous stocks of intangible wealth, according to securities values.").
250. Cf Hilary Shane & Mark Klock, The Relation Between Patent Citations and
Tobin's Q in the Semiconductor Industry, 9 REV. QUANT. FIN. & ACCT. 131, 131 (1997)
("A firm's intangible assets . . . are by their very nature more difficult to value.").
251. Cf PAULOS, supra note 242, at 158-59 (explaining that it is impossible to predict
discoveries with any accuracy).
252. See Hall, supra note 235, at 11 ("Streams of future cash growing at high rates are
hugely valuable. Growth rates of cash earned by companies exploiting new technologies
have been phenomenal. The stock-market values of these companies swing wildly.").
253. See id. at 1 ("The stock market's movements are generally consistent with
rational behavior by investors. . . . [T]he key concepts are intangibles and their valuation
based on the level and especially the growth of their cash flows.").
254. See Mark Klock & Pamela Megna, Measuring and Valuing Intangible Capital in
the Wireless Communications Industry, 40 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 519, 530 (2000)
(concluding that cellular communications companies stock values are statistically
significantly affected by measures of installed customer base).
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and because of that they will fluctuate greatly.2 55 Additionally, many
modem corporations derive a great deal of their value from embedded
options in their business.256 This means that shares of stock in high
technology companies with predominantly intellectual capital can behave
more like options on stock than the plain vanilla equity that we saw
decades ago.257 Anyone with a little understanding of modem financial
markets knows that option prices are much more volatile than the prices
of stocks for utility companies.258 A utility company is regulated, has a
predictable customer base, and will generate steady cash flows without
much growth. 25 9  This type of cash flow is easily valued like a
government bond, and the price of it will vary only a little as overall
market rates of return on investments fluctuate.260
To further understand how markets with rational investors can be
extremely volatile, and hence to understand that extreme volatility is not
evidence of irrationality in the market, it is important to understand the
concept of endogenous uncertainty. Investors' estimates of events that
are to be determined in the future, such as growth rates in customer base,
are influenced by their perceptions of what other investors' estimates
are. 26 1 For example, suppose that John and Mary have the problem of
liquidating some assets that have come into their possession from a
recently deceased relative. One item is an old piece of furniture that
Mary believes is not particularly valuable; however, some dealers and
collectors take great interest in the item. Mary will naturally revise her
beliefs given the new information that others appear to believe the item is
valuable. Alternatively, there might be a collection of old coins in the
255. See MALKIEL, supra note 240, at 103-05 (describing the difficulty of forecasting
long-term growth rates and the tendency for estimated growth rates to fluctuate between
wild optimism and extreme pessimism).
256. See WELCH, supra note 176, at 417 ("Most corporate projects teem with
embedded real options.").
257. See Mark Klock, Financial Options, Real Options, and Legal Options: Opting to
Exploit Ourselves and What We Can Do About It, 55 ALA. L. REV. 63, 72-74 (2003)
(describing the value of embedded options in businesses, especially technology).
258. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 212, at 605 ("Options have become a popular
type of investment because the potential returns from taking positions in options are
much larger than those associated with long and short positions in the underlying asset.").
259. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 66 (8th
ed. 2006) ("Utilities are mature, stable companies which ought to offer tailor-made cases
for application of the constant-growth DCF formula.").
260. Cf CHARLES J. CORRADO & BRADFORD D. JORDAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
INVESTMENTS 177-78 (3d ed. 2005) (illustrating the effect of a change in market interest
rate on a simple security).
261. See Hall, supra note 235, at 4 ("[O]ne person values another's opinion in
assessing probabilities in a nonstationary environment."); Mark Rubinstein, Rational
Markets: Yes or No? The Affirmative Case, 57 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15, 23 (2001)
(explaining the effect of endogenous uncertainty about others valuations on stock prices).
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estate that John believes is quite valuable; however, after soliciting bids
from collectors and dealers John does not receive any offers. Again,
John will naturally revise his belief about the value downward given the
information that other knowledgeable people have no interest in the
collection. This type of endogenous interaction between investors'
beliefs about what other investors' estimates are for the future occurs
constantly in the stock market and is capable of generating large swings
in stock value even when all investors are perfectly rational.26 2
Some researchers have developed models that introduce irrational
traders in the market and have obtained results that allow stock prices to
diverge substantially from their true value for indefinite periods.2 63
Behavioralists have cited this research to support their argument that
markets are not efficient.2 64 Unfortunately for the behavioralists, it has
been demonstrated that these economic models that allow markets to
escalate values well above their true worth in the presence of irrational
investors are inherently flawed because all of them implicitly assume
unlimited credit markets. 2 6 5 When reasonable structural constraints are
incorporated into a model of markets that ration credit and require budget
constraints to be satisfied and supply to equal demand, then it is not
possible for irrational investors to drive the aggregate market to an
262. See Hall, supra note 235, at 2, 10-11 (explaining that large swings in the value of
Yahoo, eBay, and Amazon were rational changes in estimates of the future).
263. J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 703, 705 (1990) ("Because the unpredictability of noise traders' future opinions
deters arbitrage, prices can diverge significantly from fundamental values even when
there is no fundamental risk. . . . All the main results of our paper come from the
observation that arbitrage does not eliminate the effects of noise. . . .").
264. See, e.g., Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets
Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 531 (2006) ("Since the initial acceptance,
criticism of the efficient market hypothesis has only grown larger. What began as a study
of a few anomalies or instances where the theory did not perform well has grown to a
well-developed alternative school of thought that has both theoretical underpinnings and
empirical research in its support."); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law:
The Role ofShareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 672 (2006) ("Stock price is a poor
measure of firm value. Even in a market that is relatively informationally efficient, it is
unlikely that market prices reflect fundamental value."); Erik F. Gerding, The Next
Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L.
REV. 393, 400 (2006) ("Behavioral finance draws upon extensive research in behavioral
psychology and economics to demonstrate that investors do not act with perfect
rationality. Moreover, behavioral finance has documented both statistical evidence of
mispricings in securities. . . ."); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms
of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 717
(2003) (claiming that behavioral finance has displaced market efficiency); Troy A.
Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 483 (2003) ("Extensive studies show sustained
mispricings and inefficiencies in capital markets. . . .").
265. See generally Klock, supra note 214, at 198-202 (explaining the fallacy of the
models which claim arbitrage does not eliminate the effects of noise traders).
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unsustainable level.266 To understand why unlimited credit is an
unrealistic assumption, we need only observe the legal construct of
limited liability. Because bankruptcy law ensures that liability will
always be limited in fact, it is necessarily the case that credit will always
be limited.267
The proof that market prices are constrained by the basic
institutional features of market clearing, budget constraints, and limited
credit without regard to investor rationality was developed by Professors
Lowenstein and Willard. They write:
We argue that many properties of asset prices can be derived without
reference to specific assumptions about investor rationality, given
minimal and natural assumptions about limited asset liability, market
clearing, and limited storage withdrawals. Our paper does not
provide a defense for either investor rationality or nonrationality....
[l]f one believes that limited asset liability, market clearing, and
limited storage withdrawals are reasonable economic assumptions,
then one must regard the implied properties of asset prices as
inviolable since they are independent of investor rationality.
The conclusions of this paper are built on the idea that certain
economic principles limit the properties of asset prices independent
of investor behavior, and that the limits implied by limited asset
liability, market clearing, and limited withdrawals from the storage
technology have been inadequately appreciated. Models that deviate
from these assumptions risk offering misleading economic insights,
no matter how tantalizing such insights may seem.268
Some stubborn readers might refuse to believe this and claim that
the stock market value in 2007 was clearly too high and that the large
drop in 2008 was completely predictable. The question such obstinate
people need to answer is why did they not become billionaires given the
predictability of the economic crisis? 2 6 9 I believe that the answer is that
in 2007 investors were forecasting positive economic growth and the
valuations in 2007 were perfectly consistent with reasonable estimates of
266. See id. at 199 ("[B]asic principles of economics, such as limited liability,
collateralized credit, and market clearing, restrict the properties of asset prices regardless
of investors' behavior.").
267. Id. at 200.
268. Mark Lowenstein and Gregory A. Willard, The Limits of Investor Behavior, 61 J.
FIN. 231, at 232, 256 (2006).
269. Cf Rubinstein, supra note 261, at 21 (stating that the evidence that actively
managed mutual funds run by smart professionals with vast resources and strong
incentives cannot outperform passive mutual funds is a nuclear bomb that wins the debate
over those claiming the stock market is predictable).
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future growth.2 70  In 2008 it became clear that the growth would not
occur, and values accordingly dropped. But there was nothing
predictable about the drop despite the fact that many people have twenty-
twenty hindsight. Another passage from Lowenstein and Willard's paper
proving that all bubble models are inherently flawed aptly summarizes
their results:
The economic intuition of our results is longstanding, clear, and
compatible with more general neoclassical models of full rationality
that are built on the same behavior-independent principles that we
study. Simply put, investor behavior can be important for
equilibrium asset prices, but only within certain limits that apply
universally to all assumptions about investor behavior. 271
In other words, investors' cognitive abilities are immaterial to the general
neoclassical model of market equilibrium. 27 2
There are two points to this digression on recent market volatility
and market efficiency. One is that volatility is not evidence of
inefficiency and we should not abandon legal doctrine that presumes that
investors purchasing securities in a public market rely on the information
in the market. 273 The other point is that market drops are normal and
natural occurrences that do not require heavy-handed paternalistic
regulation to protect investors from themselves. 274 Anti-fraud devices
are good, but paternalism is not.275
What investors should have learned from the past several years is
what finance professors have taught for decades. Diversify within asset
276classes, diversify across asset classes, and invest for the long-term.
270. Cf Hall, supra note 235, at 10-11 (explaining that the rapid appreciation in stock
prices in the 1990's was consistent with the growth in cash flows, and the reversal in the
appreciation in 2000 apparently coincided with diminished cash flow growth).
271. Lowenstein & Willard, supra note 268, at 257.
272. Klock, supra note 214, at 199.
273. Cf id. at 185-86 (suggesting that attacks on market efficiency from legal
scholars are a threat to investor sovereignty and our system of securities regulation).
274. Cf Christopher A. Stanley, The Panic Effect: Possible Unintended
Consequences of the Temporary Bans on Short Selling Enacted During the 2008
Financial Crisis, 4 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 277, 277-78 (2009) ("During almost every
financial crisis in modem history, short sellers have been the recipients of blame, and
regulators have attempted to limit the practice. This article argues that . . . enacting hasty
regulations on short selling during negative economic cycles will likely result in
unintended, adverse consequences.") (footnote omitted).
275. See Mark Klock, Dead Hands-Poison Catalyst or Strength-Enhancing
Megavitamin? An Analysis of the Benefits of Managerial Protection and the Detriments
of Judicial Interference, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 67, 126 (2001) (arguing that the
government should require and enforce anti-fraud devices but not make decisions for
investors).
276. See, e.g., FRANK K. REILLY& EDGAR A. NORTON, INVESTMENTS 11 (7th ed.
2006) ("Diversify, Diversify, Diversify: Across Assets, Industries, and Even Countries.").
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Investors who held diversified portfolios and kept them intact, shifting
fixed income investments to equity as the percentage of their portfolio
invested in equity diminished came out of the crisis in good shape.277
Those who panicked and sold their stock as values declined and failed to
keep the overall asset allocation balanced did not do well.
B. Paternalistic Protection Creates Moral Hazard
The dangers of paternalism have been extensively discussed by
Professors Gregory Mitchell and Jonathan Klick.2 78 These commentators
take note of the growing calls for government to protect people of normal
intelligence from their decisions based on "research" that suggests that
people of normal intelligence make the same bad decisions repeatedly.27 9
I place quotes around the phrase research in this context because
elsewhere Professor Mitchell, who also holds a Ph.D. in psychology and
a faculty appointment in that field, has criticized the behavioral law and
economics scholars for improperly extrapolating results from limited and
poorly controlled experiments in psychology and taking the results far
out of context.2 80 In any case, the more recent point made by Mitchell
and Klick is that even if we believe individuals make bad decisions and
we have faith that our lives would be made better by a paternalistic
government, there will be unintended and harmful consequences from
such well-meaning protection.28 1
Specifically, restraints on behavior adversely affect individual
development. 2 82 Short-term protection has a negative effect on learning
277. Suppose that at the height of the market in October 2007 Jack had $100,000
invested in stocks and $100,000 in bonds. In February of 2009 that investment in stocks
would have been worth only $50,000, but the investment in bonds would have still been
worth about $100,000. If Jack rebalanced and sold $25,000 in bonds to increase his
portfolio investment in stocks back to 50% of the total allocation, the $75,000 in stocks in
February of 2009 would have appreciated to about $126,000 by January 3, 2011. It
would then be time to rebalance the other direction and sell some stocks to increase the
proportion of the portfolio in bonds. The calculations are based on the level of the Dow
Jones Industrial Average and the data was collected from YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com. The calculation also excludes the dividends that would have
been collected and improved investment performance by even more.
278. Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality:
Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1620 (2006).
279. See generally id. at 1620-1663 (analyzing numerous proposals to remove or limit
free decision making from error prone citizens and the unintended consequences that are
likely to result in ever worsening decision-making skills).
280. See Mitchell, supra note 244.
281. See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 278, at 1625 ("[W]e argue that there will often
be long-run costs of paternalistic regulations that offset short-run gains because of the
negative learning and motivational effects of paternalistic regulations.").
282. See id at 1623 ("[R]estraints may adversely affect the development of
individuality.").
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and motivation.2 83 If individuals do not have to bear the consequences
for their poor decisions, then they will have no incentive to make better
decisions in the future and no reason to invest in learning from
mistakes.284 Lawrence Mitchell and others have made similar
arguments.
Mitchell and Klick build their argument using two bodies of
research from the field of psychology that have been ignored by
behavioralists advocating for more government protections.28 6 They
succinctly summarize these:
First, research from developmental psychology indicates that
individuals improve their decision-making skills over time through a
"learning by doing" process, and that paternalistic policies threaten
interference in this self-regulatory process. Second, research on self-
fulfilling prophecies wams that regulated parties are likely to become
the weak decision makers envisioned by paternalistic policy makers,
as paternalistic regulations undercut personal incentives to invest in
cognitive capital and the regulated parties conform to the
expectancies of the paternalist. 287
These commentators later draw three propositions from the research:
(1) [P]atemalistic policies that restrict choice options restrict learning
opportunities; (2) the noisier the learning environment, the more
difficult to learn, and paternalistic policies introduce noise into, or
mute feedback signals in, the learning environment; (3) the more
extensive the paternalism imposed on citizens, the greater the
cognitive hazard, due to restricted learning opportunities and more
noise in learning environments.288
In the terminology of economics, paternalism creates a moral
hazard whereby incentives to behave appropriately are removed and
283. See id. at 1636 ("[R]emoving incentives to make good decisions may negatively
impact activity levels and the amount of cognitive resources invested in activities ..... ").
284. See id ("Indeed, learning may be greatest in response to negative or unfavorable
outcomes.").
285. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern
Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEx L. REV. 477,
479 (1995) ("The constraining power of the state thus denies the context for full moral
personhood on the part of corporate actors and consequently relieves them of moral
responsibility for their actions on the corporation's behalf"); Klock, supra note 275, at
144 (asserting that protecting investors from their own bad judgment will inhibit
responsible investing and even encourage excessive risk taking); John Stuart Mill, On
Liberty (1859), in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 70 (John Gray ed., 1991) (arguing
broad restraints on behavior will impede the development of individuality).
286. See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 278, at 1626-27 (tying their work to research
from developmental psychology and research on self-fulfilling prophecies).
287. Id
288. Id. at 1633.
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subverted with incentives to behave inappropriately. 289  The classic
examples of this effect in the economics literature are in the insurance
market, where insured individuals are less likely to use reasonable care
or accurately report the cause of an insured loss. 2 90 Conflicts of interest
arise whenever incentives diverge. Conflicts of interest are particularly
acute in the case of insurance contracts where an insured party would
like to collect a payoff and an insurance company would like to exclude
a loss from coverage. 2 9 1 But conflicts of interest occur in more subtle
places, such as those occurring between managers and shareholders who
both want to maximize their wealth and these conflicting objectives
292might require a different set of actions. Markets can develop some
solutions to mitigate conflicts of interest.2 93  Monitoring, bonding,
deductibles, and copayments are examples.29 4 Allowing markets to
develop solutions can be more effective than regulation.29 5
A great irony underlying the arguments of those who favor heavy-
handed paternalistic regulation is that they highlight managerial
incentives to put their self-interest ahead of investors' interests, but they
deny the power of incentives for investors to act in their own interests.
Holding investors accountable for their own decisions, made in the
absence of fraud, is the best way to promote investor welfare, market
integrity, and economic growth and prosperity.296
V. THE MADOFF SCANDAL EXPOSES LIMITATIONS OF REGULATORS
Over a period of about twenty years, Bernard L. Madoff ran a Ponzi
scheme that owed about sixty billion dollars at the time of the 2008
289. Id. at 1644.
290. KENNETH J. ARROW, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to
the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, reprinted in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF
KENNETH J. ARROW 143 (1983).
291. Id.
292. See MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 172, at 3-4 (describing some conflicts of
interest innately embedded within corporations).
293. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN & STANLEY G. EAKINS, FINANCIAL MARKETS &
INSTITUTIONS 406-09 (6th ed. 2009) (describing ways that markets respond to limit the
effects of conflicts of interest).
294. Id. at 381, 564.
295. See Klock, supra note 10, at 100-01 ("The theory of regulation is based in
economics rather than morality. . . . A general conclusion in [the] literature is that
regulation that attempts to superimpose values is ineffective, or worse yet,
counterproductive."); cf FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 303 (1991) ("Regulation is more failure-prone than
markets, because there are few automatic forces that correct regulation gone awry.").
296. See Klock, supra note 10, at 77 (discussing how policing fraud and requiring full
disclosure has served the investing public well, and the lack of empirical data that
regulators can outperform investors in decision making); cf Klock, supra note 275, at
127 ("[P]rotection creates long-run detrimental incentive and behavior problems.").
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financial crisis which exposed the scheme.297 During this time Madoff
operated in plain view of the SEC. The SEC even investigated Madoff
several times based on tips from people in the industry, and on many
occasions Madoff gave SEC investigators conflicting and ridiculous
explanations for his activity that no one with a minimally competent
performance in a rudimentary finance and investments class would have
believed.298 Professor Robert Rhee called this "[t]he most scandalous
malfeasance of this new era. . . ."299 Professor Rhee further explains
"how a deficit in competence and training of lawyer regulators
contributed to market regulatory failure." 300 In this section, I will review
some of the most outlandish errors committed by the lawyer regulators in
dealing with Madoff. The intent here is to demonstrate that lawyer
regulators receiving the current U.S. legal curriculum training not only
lack the education and experience required for regulating the commercial
world well, they also lack the appropriate incentives.
The SEC had several opportunities to expose Madoff before he
surrendered to authorities on December 10, 2008, which could have
potentially saved investors billions of dollars.3 0 1 The first golden
297. See Grant McCool & Martha Graybow, Madoff Pleads Guilty, Is Jailed for $65
Billion Fraud, REUTERS, Mar. 13, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE52A5JK20090313 ("[P]rosecutors have said it amounted to as much as $65
billion over 20 years and involved more than 4,800 client accounts.").
298. See generally Klock, supra note 4, at 788-808 (elaborating on details of the
SEC's numerous missteps in investigating Madoff).
299. Rhee, supra note 4, at 363.
300. Id
301. See FTI CONSULTING & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, REPORT No. 468, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF OCIE EXAMINATIONS OF BERNARD
L. MADOFF INVESTMENT SECURITIES, LLC at ii (Sept. 29, 2009) available at
http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2009/468.pdf [hereinafter FTI,
REVIEW OF OCIE EXAMINATIONS] ("The FTI Engagement Team found that OCIE
examiners made critical mistakes in nearly every aspect of their examinations of Madoff
and BMIS and missed significant opportunities to uncover Madoff's Ponzi scheme. The
FTI Engagement Team concluded that OCIE examiners did not properly plan or conduct
their examinations of Madoff. ); OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at
457. The OIG report stated:
The OG found that the conduct of the examinations and investigations was
similar in that they were generally conducted by inexperienced personnel, not
planned adequately, and were too limited in scope. While examiners and
investigators discovered suspicious information and evidence and caught
Madoff in contradictions and inconsistencies, they either disregarded these
concerns or relied inappropriately upon Madoff s representations and
documentation in dismissing them. Further, the SEC examiners and
investigators failed to understand the complexities of Madoff's trading and the
importance of verifying his returns with independent third-parties.
Id
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opportunity occurred in 1992.302 Tipsters to the SEC reported that two
south Florida accountants named Avellino and Bienes were selling
unregistered securities. 303 Avellino and Bienes were soliciting sales for
unregistered securities with written guarantees of zero risk and
guaranteed returns ranging from 13.5% to 20%.304 Avellino and Bienes
had been selling these securities for more than a decade and had
collected $440 million from investors.305 When the SEC investigated
Avellino and Bienes seeking to recover investors' funds, they were told
that all of the money had been invested with Madoff.30 6 SEC officials
contacted Madoff and asked for help in returning the money. 30 7 The next
day, Madoff turned over $440 million.308
This event should have sounded several alarms. The first principle
of finance is that due to intense competition to make profits, higher
returns can only be obtained by taking higher risks.30 9 Arbitrage cannot
persist and zero risk investments must earn the riskless rate of return in
equilibrium. 3 10  Although .arbitrage opportunities can occur, the
competition in the market eliminates them quickly.3 11 When stock index
arbitrage first developed in the early 1980's, arbitrage opportunities
would be eliminated typically within forty-five minutes.312 The
subsequent reduction in trading costs and the subsequent improvements
302. See OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 61 ("[A]ssuming that
Bernard Madoff was running his Ponzi scheme in 1992, the SEC missed an excellent
opportunity to uncover this scheme by not undertaking a more thorough and
comprehensive investigation.") (footnote omitted containing facts suggesting that
Madoffs Ponzi scheme was running in 1992).
303. See Randall Smith, Wall Street Mystery Features a Big Board Rival, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 16, 1992, at Cl ("The Securities and Exchange Commission recently cracked
down on one of the largest-ever sales of unregistered securities. Investors had poured
$440 million into investment pools raised by two Florida accountants, who for more than
a decade took in money without telling the SEC. . .
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 46.
307. Id. at 53 (reporting New York Enforcement Staff attorney's recollection about
approaching Madoff for the return of investors' funds).
308. Id. ("[Madoff] was able indeed to liquidate the investments and get the cash
available within a very short period of time ... ).
309. See MALKIEL, supra note 240, at 220-21 (1999) ("As every reader should know
by now, risk has its rewards. . . . Thus, to get a higher average long-run rate of return in a
portfolio, you need to increase the risk level of the portfolio. . . .").
310. See generally WELCH, supra note 176, at 360-63 (defining and explaining
arbitrage).
311. See id at 362 ("True arbitrage opportunities are difficult or outright impossible
to find in the real world, especially in very competitive financial markets.").
312. Cf Zvi BODIE ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENTS 587 (5th ed. 2004)
(describing how the arbitrage only works if many securities can be traded simultaneously
because the opportunities are short-lived, and hence require programs to send multiple
orders directly to the exchange floor over computer lines).
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in communications and data processing caused these opportunities to
disappear even more quickly.3 13  The idea that someone could
consistently generate high returns at no risk over a long period is no
more credible than the idea that a single Santa Claus can deliver presents
to every house around the world in a single night.
Additionally, the second principal of finance is that liquid
investments (investments that can be converted to cash quickly and
cheaply) provide an even lower return. 3 14  The fact that Madoff
liquidated the high yield investments for full value in a single day was
another alarm that was set off, but ignored. The obvious question that
SEC investigators should have asked Madoff in 1992 was, where did he
get the $440 million from in a day? 315 Astonishingly, no one asked the
316question.
After dodging that bullet, Madoff's Ponzi scheme continued to
operate under the radar until 2000 when a competing financial analyst
named Harry Markopolis began trying to get the SEC to investigate
Madoff.3 17 In 2001, Barron's reported that many people in the industry
were skeptical and believed that Madoff could not be doing what he
claimed to do.3 18 These events should have triggered investigation by the
SEC, but did not.3 19 Not until several more detailed complaints came in
did the SEC commence another investigation with the potential to
uncover the Ponzi scheme. 32 0  Between 2004 and 2008, several
investigations were opened and closed without uncovering the Ponzi
scheme, notwithstanding complaints and tips received detailing the facts
that indicated Madoff had to be running a Ponzi scheme.3 2 1  These
313. See David E. Sanger, Market Turmoil; Program Trading Curb Now Widely
Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1987, at D1 ("[C]omputers have tightened the links
between the two markets, assuring that when one moves, the other moves with it.")
(interviewing Louis Margolis, Managing Director, Salomon Bros.).
314. See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 267 (4th ed. 1999) ("Investors prefer
more liquid assets with lower transaction costs, so it should not surprise us to find that all
else equal, relatively illiquid assets trade at lower prices or, equivalently, that the
expected return on illiquid assets must be higher.").
315. OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 26 (stating that an
investigation into the source of the money would have been "common sense").
316. See id. at 61 ("[N]o investigative actions were taken to determine if the funds
that Avellino & Bienes arranged to have repaid were taken from other customers as part
of a larger Ponzi scheme engineered by Bernard Madoff").
317. OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 61.
318. Id. at 75-76 (citing Erin Arvelund, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, BARRON'S, May 7,
2001, at 26).
319. Id. at 76-77.
320. See Klock, supra note 4, at 794 (stating that an investigation was not conducted
until 2004 after receiving additional complaints).
321. See generally OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 31-41
(chronicling the investigations and tips during this period).
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investigations focused on mundane minor technical violations. For
example, there was some focus on whether Madoff was giving
investment advice when he was not registered as an investment
advisor. 32 2 Also, there was some focus on whether Madoff was front-
running his customers even though the complaints about Madoff did not
allege front-running. 3 2 3 Front-running occurs when a broker executes
trades for his own account in front of the trades he executes for his
clients, for his advantage and for the clients' disadvantage.324 The
explanation given by the SEC enforcement staff for focusing on front-
running was that the lawyers running the investigation only had
experience dealing with front-running. 32 5
In fact, the complaints alleged much more serious charges, and were
supported with facts and analysis that did not receive competent
investigation. One issue raised pertained to Madoffs business model,
which purported to abandon management fees that Madoff could have
earned amounting to billions of dollars, and instead paid that money out
to feeder funds, which channeled investor money to Madoff.32 6 In order
for the business model to work, not only would Madoff need to
irrationally abandon that money for himself, but he had to generate an
additional four percent above what he was promising investors.32 7
Madoff also suspiciously claimed to be earning high returns
consistently--even during recession periods-without taking risks. 32 8
He claimed to be doing this by hedging his positions in the options
market, but the strategy did not make sense financially and, more
significantly, the volume of trading required to support this hedging did
not exist on the options exchange.329
When Madoff was asked about the lack of volume on the options
exchange he asserted that he traded options over-the-counter after hours
322. See id at 37 ("[M]ost of the Enforcement staff's efforts during their
investigation were directed at determining whether Madoff should register as an
investment adviser. . . .").
323. FTI, REVIEW OF OCIE EXAMrNATIONS, supra note 301, at 6.
324. Id. at n.4.
325. See id. at 11 ("OCIE management indicated that the Market Oversight/SRO
group decided to focus on front-running during the cause examination because that was
the group's area of expertise.").
326. Michael Ocrant, Madoff Tops Charts: Skeptics Ask How, MARIHEDGE, May
2001, at 3, available at http://nakedshorts.typepad.com/files/madoff.pdf ("[E]xperts
ask ... why Madoff Securities is willing to earn commissions off the trades but not set up
a separate asset management division to offer hedge funds directly to investors and keep
all the incentive fees for itself. . , .").
327. Rhee, supra note 4, at 367-68.
328. See OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 21, 22, 27-28 (describing
the impossibility of Madoff's claimed returns).
329. Rhee, supra note 4, at 368.
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in Europe. 3 30  The claim was preposterous, but was accepted by the
investigators without verification.3 3 1 Amazingly, when the scandal came
out and the investigators were interviewed, they claimed that they never
attempted to verify Madoffs conflicting and contradictory explanations
with third parties. 3 3 2 Apparently, they did not consider verification to be
part of the job of conducting an investigation. Such a response displays a
lack of competence that is much broader than merely not understanding
derivative financial instruments.
Madoff also provided computer printouts of positions he held, but
investigators never attempted to verify those positions with third parties,
such as the clearing corporation. 3 33 The clearing corporation clears and
settles all transactions in publicly traded securities and maintains data on
the trades.334 The SEC has access to the data and uses it to trigger
investigations in cases involving possible insider trading, such as former
New York Congressman Rick Lazio.3 3 5 Any effort to verify Madoff's
statements would have revealed that they were fraudulent. 33 6
Apparently, in order to avoid some financial reporting, Madoff also
made the remarkable claim at one point to not hold securities at the close
of each month because he converted all of his positions to cash at the end
of each month.33 7 The transactions costs and tax consequences of such a
strategy would make it less profitable and therefore implausible.33 8 This
should have sounded another alarm.
One other red flag that the SEC ignored was Madoffs auditor.3 39
Madoff was asked to produce audited financial statements and he
produced audits purportedly done by David Friehling.34 0 But no one had
330. Cf OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 285 ("[T]he Enforcement
staff was not suspicious of Madoff's claim to have had billions of dollars invested in
undocumented OTC options contracts.").
331. Id. at 314.
332. See id at 333 ("Bachenheimer .. . testified that obtaining third-party verification
was not an 'essential' part of a Ponzi scheme investigation ... ).
333. See id. at 39 (suggesting that "the most egregious failure" of the SEC staff was to
not verify trade data).
334. FTI, REVIEW OF OCIE EXAMINATIONS, supra note 301, at 25.
335. See Clifford J. Levy and Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Investigating Lazio Trading In
Securities of Donors' Company, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2000, at B I (stating that suspicious
trading volume was noted in data from the Clearing Corporation).
336. OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 40.
337. See id at 80 ("[A]ccounts are typically in cash at month end.").
338. Klock, supra note 4, at 795.
339. See FTI, REVIEW OF OCIE EXAMINATIONS, supra note 301, at 37 ("Examinations
did not adequately look into the allegations of the auditor's lack of independence or refer
such allegations to the appropriate agency."); OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra
note 7, at 419 (noting that the investment community was concerned about Madoffs
auditor being small and unknown while Madoff was reportedly managing billions of
dollars).
340. OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 173-74.
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ever heard of David Friehling, and Friehling did not have the resources
to conduct a competent audit of an operation as large as Bernard L.
Madoff Securities, LLC.34 1 Indeed, Friehling had annually told the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants that he did not
perform audits. 34 2  Under the Sarbanes-Oxley law passed in 2002,
Friehling should have been required to be registered with the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board to conduct audits of a brokerage
firm, but the SEC had issued a waiver for auditors of privately held
firms.3 43  Still, the investigators should have been alerted by the
insignificance of the audit firm. 344 Indeed, once Madoff was arrested it
took investigators visiting Friehling's office only a few hours to realize
that no bona fide audit work had ever been done.345
In the words of Professor Rhee, "the SEC and its lawyers were
presented the proverbial "videotape" of the [Madoff] crime, and yet they
were unable to comprehend what had occurred because they lacked the
skills, knowledge, and education."3 4 6  To make matters worse, the
incompetent investigations of Madoff actually exacerbated the fraud
because they gave outsiders some validation that Madoff was
legitimate.347 Numerous investors testified that Madoff told them that he
had been investigated and cleared by the SEC and that they had relied on
the SEC's scrutiny of Madoff as evidence that his operation was
legitimate.348
341. See id at 419 (reporting that the unknown and small accounting business was a
matter of concern to sophisticated investors); Reuters, Regulators Defend Madoff
Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/
business/28madoff.html? r-1 ("Mr. Dodd expressed disbelief that the S.E.C. did not zero
in on the fact that Mr. Madoff's auditor was a tiny, little-known auditor. 'Isn't it often a
preliminary questions to ask, who is your auditor?' said Mr. Dodd.").
342. See Complaint at 45, S.E.C. v. Friehling (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009) (No. 09
Civ. 2467) ("[A]nnually since 1994, Friehling falsely told the AICPA that he did not
conduct audits."), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-60.htm (last
visited Jan. 18, 2011).
343. See Floyd Norris, Audit Rule Is Revived By S.E.C, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at
B5 ("Brokerage firms like Madoff Securities are required to be audited by firms that were
registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which was created
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 [but Friehling was not registered because the SEC
issued a waiver of the requirement for privately held firms].").
344. See Klock, supra note 4, at 816 ("For a financial player the size of Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities, LLC to not use a large auditor should have generated
immediate suspicion about the credibility of the audits.").
345. OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 174 n.107.
346. Rhee, supra note 4, at 377.
347. See OIG, INVESTIGATION OF MADOFF, supra note 7, at 25 ("[T]he fact the SEC
had conducted examinations and investigations and did not detect the fraud, lent
credibility to Madoff s operations and had the effect of encouraging additional
individuals and entities to invest with him.").
348. See id. ("[1]nvestors who may have been uncertain about whether to invest with
Madoff were reassured by the fact that the SEC had investigated and/or examined
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VI. OPTIMAL REGULATION SHOULD INCENTIVIZE ETHICS
A. A Problem with Paternalistic Regulators-Inability to Define the
Public Good
Improved training in law schools can improve the competence of
financial regulators. 349 Law schools could require training in statistical
and economic reasoning and also educate students about the valuation of
financial assets and the structure of financial markets. 350 This should be
done to improve the advice that lawyers give their clients.35 ' However,
even improved training for law students is unlikely to lead to efficient
paternalistic decision making for investors by regulators because the
regulators will still lack the appropriate incentives. 352
The desire to work for the public interest or the public good can be
a strong incentive, but it is not as powerful as the incentive to work for
one's own self-interest.353  Investors, in the absence of paternalistic
intervention, have a powerful incentive to invest in their own best
interests, and are best able to determine what their own best interests
are.3 54 They know whether they are saving to obtain a down payment for
a house in two years or for retirement in 30 years. They know whether
they favor conservative investments without risk or whether they have
Madoff... and found no evidence of fraud. Moreover, we found that Madoff proactively
informed potential investors that the SEC had examined his operations.").
349. See, e.g., Jose Gabilondo, Financial Moral Panic! Sarbanes-Oxley, Financier
Folk Devils, and Off-Balance-Sheet Arrangements, 36 SETON HALL L. REv. 781, 850
(2006) ("1 call on my transactional law colleagues to foster more integration of analytical
financial methods into a basic legal education. Such an approach might produce more
transactional lawyers capable of spotting and stemming future financial moral panics.").
350. Cf Robert J. Rhee, The Socratic Method and the Mathematical Heuristic of
George P6lya, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 881, 882 n.5 (2007) ("In my classes, Torts,
Business Associations, Corporate Finance, and Negotiations, basic mathematical
intuitions arise more frequently than students prefer. Examples include complex
causation, marginal costs, capital structure, asset valuation, expected value and
probabilities, and basic intuitions of law and economics.").
351. See Thomas D. Morgan, Educating Lawyers for the Future Legal Profession, 30
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 537, 541 (2005) ("Clients of the future ... are even more likely to
want their lawyers to resemble multi-disciplinary consultants rather than narrow legal
technicians.").
352. See Klock, supra note 4, at 833 ("We can provide more training for SEC
examiners and more rules and checklists for them to follow, but at the end of the day, a
government employee does not have as strong an incentive to adequately police the
market as private market participants have to protect their investments.").
353. Cf EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 295, at 303 ("We have no desire to
commit the . . . fallacy of asserting that if markets are 'imperfect' regulation must be
better. . . . Regulation is more failure prone than markets because . . . the regulatory
system lacks a competitor. . . .").
354. See Klock, supra note 275, at 126 ("Shareholders, not judges, are in the best
position to decide [their best interests].").
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the temperament and disposition to ride the volatility of the stock market.
Regulators working for the public good have two problems to overcome
that cannot be solved. First, the public good is not defined, and indeed it
cannot be defined as has been demonstrated by Kenneth Arrow's well-
known impossibility theorem.35 1 Second, even the most fervent true
believers working in regulatory agencies must concede that there are
some workers in their agency who are merely there to collect a paycheck
because it was the best job they could get in the location where they
desire to reside.356 Such regulators have little incentive to work in the
best interest of the public even if they could define it.
Arrow's impossibility theorem, referred to in the preceding
paragraph, is a rigorous formal mathematical proof that it is impossible
to construct a democratic voting scheme that will result in rational social
preferences. 5 Arrow's Theorem is also sometimes called the paradox
of voting.35 8 The paradox is that election results need not map into social
preferences and need not lead to a rational preference ordering. 3 59
Professor Hal Varian gives an example in a popular microeconomics
text.360 A bill before Congress in 1956 called for federal aid for school
construction. 36 1 One legislator introduced an amendment to the bill that
would limit federal aid for school construction to states with integrated
schools.3 62 There were three roughly equal sized groups in the House of
Representatives. 363 Professor Varian describes how the procedural rules
of voting on the amendment were first used to defeat a bill that originally
had a majority of support:
355. See generally, Mark Klock, Is It "The Will of the People" or a Broken Arrow?
Collective Preferences, Out-of-the-Money Options, Bush v. Gore, and Arguments for
Quashing Post-Balloting Litigation Absent Specific Allegations ofFraud, 57 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1, 14-16 (2002) (explaining Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Kenneth Arrow's
contribution in proving the theorem).
356. See, e.g., William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition,
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1861, 1878 (1995)
("[N]ow regulators should be expected to behave no differently than actors in private
economic relations.").
357. Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL.
EcoN. 328, (1950); see also Klock, supra note 355, at 15.
358. Klock, supra note 355, at 15.
359. Id.
360. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECOMIcs 710 (8th ed. 2010). For a second
example, see also PAULOS, supra note 242, at 104-06 (explaining that five reasonable but
different methods of combining preferences at a hypothetical 1992 presidential election
voting caucus could create five different winning candidates).
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* Republicans. They were opposed to Federal aid to education, but
preferred the amended bill to the original. Their ranking of the
alternatives was no bill, amended bill, original bill.
* Northern Democrats. They wanted Federal aid to education and
supported integrated schools, so they ranked the alternatives
amended bill, original bill, no bill.
* Southern Democrats. This group wanted Federal aid to education,
but would not get any aid under the amended bill due to the
segregated schools in the South. Their ranking was original
bill, no bill, amended bill.
In the vote on the amendment, the Republicans and the Northern
Democrats were in the majority, thereby substituting the amended bill
for the original. In the vote on the amended bill, the Republicans and
the Southern Democrats were in the majority, and the amended bill
was defeated. However, before being amended the original bill had a
majority of the votes!36
365The paradox of voting was discovered in the 18 t' century. It was
forgotten and then rediscovered in the 1 9 th century by Lewis Carroll who
observed that faculty votes at Oxford were logically inconsistent and
highly sensitive to procedural rules. 3 66 But the formal proof was never
developed until Arrow worked it out in the 2 0th century, and received a
Nobel Prize for the work.367
According to Professor Laurence Tribe, the significance of Arrow's
work is that it is impossible to construct the will of the people. 3 68 The
"public good" must be an even more elusive concept than the "will of the
people" and if we cannot construct the later, surely we cannot divine the
former. The inability of political processes and institutions to produce
stable results suggests that it is not wise to use non-market interventions
to "protect" market participants from their informed decisions, whatever
cognitive biases they might have. 3 69
364. Id. at 710-11.
365. Klock, supra note 355, at 14.
366. IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION 10 (1987).
367. Klock, supra note 355, at 14.
368. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-7, at 12 n.6 (2d
ed. 1988) (noting that Arrow's theorem suggests that there is no hope of meaningfully
constructing majority will).
369. Cf Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for
Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1354 (2007) ("[S]tock markets
appear nonetheless to be superior to alternative approaches to distributing capital, such as
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B. Incentivizing Ethics Works Better than Micro-Management
The period before 1933 is often portrayed as a time of caveat
emptor in the financial markets. 37 0 Although many states had laws on the
books regulating the sale of securities, 371 fraudsters could move from
state to state and escape jurisdiction. The passage of the federal
securities laws changed the world for the better by abandoning the
philosophy of caveat emptor with a comprehensive plan to deter fraud by
providing for strict liability for failure to disclose any material fact in the
primary market, and for using any manipulative or deceptive device in
the secondary market. 37 2  However, Congress wisely stopped short of
paternalistic regulation.373
At the time these laws were new, there was no distinction between
fraudsters who were primarily liable and fraudsters who were
secondarily liable.374 Anyone knowingly participating in the fraud would
be liable.375 Legal developments during the previous two decades have
reduced investor protection from fraud.376 As a result of changed
incentives that immunize many participants in fraud from liability, we
have witnessed an increase in shady gray unethical conduct, and blatant
assigning government officials or panels of experts to judging the future effectiveness of
various companies.").
370. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder
Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1503, 1541 (2006).
371. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 14 (2004) ("At the time of the
Great Crash, nearly all states embraced some form of regulation of brokers and
securities.").
372. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (providing for strict
liability for failure to disclose all material facts in the registration statement); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2009) (prohibiting manipulative or
deceptive devices in connections with the sale of a security).
373. See Klock, supra note 10, at 77 (stating that Congress rejected merit regulation
for good reason).
374. Prentice, supra note 6, at 625.
375. Id. at 624.
376. See Murdock, supra note 17, at 131. Professor Murdock begins his
condemnation of judges and politicians for removing investor protections:
This article asserts that Congress and the federal courts are complicit in the
widespread corporate corruption that has come to light this past decade. It
begins by exploring the notion of bias and then chronicles judicial
developments which have protected corporate officials, who have engaged in
securities fraud and other wrongful conduct, at the expense of innocent
shareholders and investors. It also analyzes the public policy in favor of
corruption embodied in the Private Litigation Securities Reform Act, and the
actions of federal courts in expanding the protection of PLSRA even beyond
that dictated by the language of the statute.
Id.
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fraud.377 This in turn has led to calls for more heavy-handed regulation
proposing more technical rules for accounting statements and limitations
on investor choices.3 78  These proposals carry their own perverse
consequences and are not necessary.379 All that is needed to restore
confidence in the market is a return to the original intent and philosophy
of federal securities laws that allows private causes of action to recover
against all who substantially participate in securities fraud.380 Such a
change by Congress would provide the appropriate incentives to foster a
high level of ethical behavior in the financial sector. 38'
Well before the wave of accounting scandals hit, the SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt stated in a portion of a 1998 speech:
I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings, and
therefore, the quality of financial reporting. Managing may be giving
way to manipulation; Integrity may be losing out to illusion.
Many in corporate America are just as frustrated and concerned about
this trend as we, at the SEC, are. They know how difficult it is to
hold the line on good practices when their competitors operate in the
gray area between legitimacy and outright fraud.
A gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers
are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of
management rather than the underlying financial performance of the
382company.
377. See id. at 209 ("The theme of this article is that courts and legislatures,
particularly Congress and the federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, have been
complicit by creating an environment in which management is not called to account.").
378. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case
of the Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 78 (2006) ("Regulators have
taken several steps to address irrational investor trading in reliance on tainted or biased
analyst recommendations. Overall, the approach has evolved from one of disclosure and
investor education to an increasing degree of paternalism.").
379. See Klick and Mitchell, supra note 278, at 1661 ("[G]ovemment regulation
intended to counter irrational tendencies may actually exacerbate the problem. . . .").
380. See Murdock, supra note 17, at 210 ("One modest way to begin the process of
restoring integrity to the securities markets, shake up management, and wake up
gatekeepers would be for the new Congress to reinstate aiding and abetting liability in
private actions.").
381. See Klock, supra note 10, at 109 ("The vehicle for attaining full disclosure is
attachment of civil liability for anything less. . . .").
382. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, The Numbers Game, Remarks to the NYU
Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt).
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Chairman Levitt then went on to propose technical rule changes to
alleviate the problem, 383 which of course they did not. I suggest a
simpler fix: expose those who operate in the gray area to private liability.
Doing so will push gatekeepers to operate within the safe harbor of
ethical behavior.8 This is the approach envisioned in the fundamental
philosophy underlying our first federal securities law. 8 Section 12 of
the Securities Act of 1933 provides for strict liability of losses by a seller
who makes a communication to an investor "which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading. ... 386 The term "material" is
gray.387 As a consequence, sellers are incentivized to disclose anything
that might in hindsight be considered material.3 88 This provision
incentivizes sellers to act accordingly with the highest ethical standards
and disclose anything that might be material rather than hiding
information. 389 Likewise, Rule 10b-5 contains similar broad language
that provides incentives to insiders to disclose anything that might be
material prior to trading.3 90
To restore the shaky confidence in our securities markets for the
long-term, we need a similar device to incentivize accountants, auditors,
bankers, credit rating agencies, underwriters, and all secondary
participants in our securities markets to behave ethically.3 9 1 That device
is private action liability for aiding and abetting or otherwise assisting
any violation of federal securities laws.392 The recently enacted Dodd-
383. See id ("Therefore, I am calling for immediate and coordinated action: technical
rule changes by the regulators and standard setters to improve the transparency of
financial statements. . . .").
384. See Klock, supra note 14, at 343 (describing how private aiding and abetting
liability will improve ethical standards).
385. See id. (explaining the statutory scheme of the first federal security law).
386. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006).
387. See Klock, supra note 14, at 343 (explaining what happens when it is
questionable whether an item is material).
388. See Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and
Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1981) ("With the view toward protection against
liability, there is a tendency to resolve all doubts against the company and to make things
look as bleak as possible.").
389. See id ("[E]stablished underwriters and experienced counsel ... traditionally
lean to a very conservative presentation, avoiding glowing adjectives and predictions.").
390. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (1995).
391. See Klock, supra note 14, at 343 ("We need legislation that expressly puts
unethical corporate officers and others on notice that they will be liable to victims for
these risk-creating decisions.").
392. See id at 353 ("The remedy is simple-provide a private cause of action for
aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b). Such regulation provides market-based
incentives for ethical conduct. . . .") (emphasis added).
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Frank bill3 93 does not do this and is an extreme disappointment
considering that better results could have been obtained at lower costs by
simply legislating private action liability exposure for aiding and abetting
fraud. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from this is that
our political leaders are not against fraud.394
VII. CONCLUSION
Following the Great Depression, Congress decided to federalize
securities regulation. 39 5 The legislation was intended to serve a broad
remedial purpose-to provide relief for defrauded investors and to
protect the integrity of the market.39 6 At that point in time, common law
fraud doctrine held knowing participants in a fraud jointly liable.3 97
Congress clearly intended to provide remedies that expanded on the
common law of the time, and indeed, sought to give the SEC broad
powers.39 8
The original philosophy of the federal securities was merely anti-
fraud, incentivizing market participants to provide full and fair disclosure
by making them criminally and civilly liable for material misstatement
and omissions, and deceptive practices. 399 This experiment worked well
for decades. 40 0 Financial markets grew enormously. 401 Over time, the
393. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
394. See Prentice, supra note 6, at 682 ("The Stoneridge holding indicates that, no,
some of us are not against fraud anymore."); Murdock, supra note 17, at 134-35 (arguing
that courts and legislators are willing to permit fraud because they have a bias in favor of
management).
395. COX ET AL., supra note 371, at 3.
396. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). The Court
noted:
The Securities Act of 1933 . . . was designed to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in
commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of
specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair
dealing. . . . The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against
manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions....
Id
397. Prentice, supra note 6, at 622.
398. See id. at 628 ("Congress enacted Section 10(b) for the purpose of strengthening
investor protection. . . ."); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 392 (1990) ("One plain-language reading
of section 10(b) gives the Commission broad power to regulate any practice that
contributes to disorder in the securities markets or that displays speculative sentiment.").
399. See STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 1 ("Undoubtedly, the central focus of the
securities laws is that of disclosure, thereby providing shareholders and the marketplace
with sufficient information to make relevant decisions and to be apprised of significant
developments.").
400. See Klock, supra note 14, at 351 ("The concept of full and fair disclosure has
served the market well.").
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law came to distinguish between different types of participants in fraud,
those who were primarily liable and those who were secondarily
liable.40 2 However, the doctrine of aiding and abetting fraud liability
continued to provide relief for defrauded investors and also provide some
incentives for ethical behavior by lawyers, accountants, auditors,
bankers, and others working in the financial sector.403
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declared that secondary
participants cannot be held liable in Central Bank 40 4  This greatly
reduced incentives to behave ethically and the result was an increase in
the size and number of financial scandals. 405 The Supreme Court greatly
exacerbated the problem in Stoneridge by construing secondary
participation broadly and primary participation narrowly so that fraud in
the market for goods and services which affects the market's valuation of
securities is deemed too remote of a factor to attach liability. 40 6 Financial
market participants in fraud are immunized from private action liability
under federal securities laws as long as they do not sell or communicate
directly with investors.407
Meanwhile, the Madoff scandal has publicly exposed the SEC as
lacking the resources, incentives, and competence to adequately protect
investors and police fraud in the securities markets.4 08 Although 2010
was a good year for the stock market compared with the previous two,
401. Cf Klock, supra note 214, at 186 ("Our philosophy of letting people make their
own choices, absent fraud and without judging those choices, has served our . . .
economic prosperity well.").
402. See Prentice, supra note 6, at 645 ("The distinction between primary and
secondary liability ... largely came into existence in 1966 ... ).
403. Cf Edward Labaton, Consequences, Intended and Unintended, of Securities Law
Reform, 29 STETSON L. REV. 395, 411-12 (1999) ("Why was aiding and abetting liability
important? . .. [T]hese secondary actors often have been accurately characterized as the
gatekeepers of our securities markets. . . . Many, perhaps most, securities frauds cannot
be accomplished without the participation or inaction of these professionals.").
404. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 191 (1994).
405. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 288-90 (attributing a marked decline in securities
class actions against accountants, corporate counsel, and underwriters to legal changes
including the elimination of aiding and abetting liability).
406. See Klock, supra note 14, at 333 (suggesting that the Court construed primary
liability narrowly in order to address the question of secondary liability for vendors).
407. See Sinai, supra note 60, at 187 ("[A] professional can rest easy so long as the
attorney, CPA, and investment banker make no statements to the public. It appears no
matter their culpability, they will escape private civil liability under § 10(b).").
408. See Klock, supra note 4, at 784 ("[T]he Barney Fife caricature aptly portrays the
personnel in the SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations."); Rhee,
supra note 4, at 380 ("The SEC's mishandling of the Madoff investigation is
indefensible.").
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IMPROVING THE CULTURE OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
the market is still well below its high in 2007.409 Now is the time to act.
Words are meaningless without action.4 10 If the members of Congress
are truly against fraud, they must signal so by introducing and voting for
legislation that restores private action liability for aiding and abetting
fraud.
409. On January 13, 2011 the Dow was less than 79% of its all-time closing high on
October 12, 2007. See YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^DJI+
Historical+Prices (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
410. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in
Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 471 (2002) ("Talk is cheap.").
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